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Abstract
By the mid-1990s, the internet had taken new form outside of its original military applications
and became commercially available at an unprecedented rate. Western democracies recognized
that such a new frontier, therefore, necessitated regulation. Their shared goal was to restrict
objectionable content while simultaneously creating a pathway for this nascent industry to
blossom. With this in mind, both the U.S. and European Union enacted linearly different and
mutually exclusive regulatory regimes to govern “online intermediaries,” or sites like Facebook
and Twitter that merely host the speech of their users. The E.U. enacted aggressive content
removal statutes, while the U.S. offered nearly blanket immunity to these sites in the hope that
the marketplace of ideas would dilute objectionable content. Using the U.S. and Germany as case
studies, this thesis argues that, twenty years later, neither pathway emerged particularly
victorious in their quest to curb the dissemination of radicalizing content. I find that the failure
under the German preemptive framework derives from a contradictory monitoring obligation and
lack of oversight by the European Commission on the state. Conversely, I find that the failure
under the American deregulatory framework is rooted in a contradictory allocation of
jurisdiction and a lack of oversight by the state upon intermediaries. By scrutinizing the incentive
structures of both countries’ regulatory regimes, this thesis challenges the way Western
democracies conceptualized and continue to conceptualize the internet and points out how
neither extreme has responsively moderated internet speech.
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Introduction
Addiction to social media and negative perceptions of one’s self are pervasive issues
amongst my generation and one’s that certainly deserve attention from a variety of fields. There
are volumes of books being written about the effect that childhood social media usage has on
later personal development. But such is out of the scope of what I am seeking to investigate. This
thesis targets the extent to which the reality around us, not so much our conceptions of ourselves,
is distorted by the content we consume online. There is an important subset of social media
studies emerging as a result of our entrance into what many pundits are calling the resurgence of
a “post-truth era.” The validity of the world around us is up for debate and the internet offers
people an interactive opportunity to distort their reality. Our ability to develop and comprehend
ideas and think for ourselves is jeopardized by our overreliance on fast news, curated content,
and inflammatory responses.
I’ve seen both ends of this spectrum firsthand. Classmates at my all-boys, Catholic high
school became consumed by the radicalizing content of Tucker Carlson, Alex Jones, and the late
Rush Limbaugh. It’s still tough to see, almost four years later, the social media content my high
school classmates continue to repost: misinformation about vaccinations or voter fraud in
addition to generally xenophobic, racist, and sexist content. They give power to this content
every time they retweet, reshare, or comment. With all the love I have for Bates, I can say at
times it is no different. I’ve been disheartened by the sight of my fellow Batesies shouting down
an invited speaker in the spring of 2019, targeting specific right-leaning students by name in
hurtful online campaigns in the fall of 2021, and largely shutting down avenues of healthy
discourse in our recently reopened Commons dining hall that don’t align with the talking points
of the New England liberal left.
1

None of this is unique to the internet and none of this should come as a shock. Political
radicalization is a widely discussed concept in the field of political science. These instances of
left and right-wing radicalization are problems, but not the crux of my investigation – they are
symptoms of a more deadly issue. Events like January 6th in the United States, the attempted
Day X in Germany, and unfortunately many others are all the result of people whose reality had
been distorted to an even more harmful degree, who were empowered to believe that their fringe
beliefs were mainstream maxims, and who felt obliged to act on that empowerment. The
inspiration behind this thesis was to investigate radicalization that begets violence and
particularly how attempts to mitigate that pipeline have uniquely failed.
The most recent comprehensive internet regulations in the E.U. and the U.S. took place in
2000 and 1996, respectively. Over the past 20-25 years, we’ve seen a dramatic increase in the
incidence of domestic terror. In fairness, this is the result of a variety of factors. But social media
has played a not insignificant role in that phenomenon. As a result, Section 230, the
E-Commerce Directive, and other major pieces of legislation have become household names, or
at least have entered mainstream debate. Further, the majority of articles on content moderation
speak to its need for reform. To me, the question became: then why hasn’t it happened in the last
two decades? Why has objectionable content continued to radicalize the polity? It’s certainly not
out of a lack of effort or legislation, so why have we not seen results?
Both the U.S. and Germany enacted linearly different and mutually exclusive regulatory
regimes to solve the problem of the internet being increasingly used to host and amplify
objectionable content. Further, by regulatory regimes I mean the whole body of the regulation
and not just the way the bills themselves. Rather regulatory regimes are meant to refer to the
interaction of the various branches of government (legislative, executive, judicial, state-level,
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Federal-level, etc.) to execute the philosophical regulatory framework each body set out to
employ. However, neither direction has proven to be demonstrably more efficient in reducing the
radicalization of people to the fringes.
In researching this topic, I hypothesized that it’s because both bodies are metaphorically
throwing ladders into quicksand. Western democracies are using a shaky foundation to support
their attempts to escape from sinking. Both the U.S. and Germany have been using exogenous
solutions to solve their endogenous problems. If Western democracies want to meaningfully
improve the quality of online speech and reduce the influence of radicalizing content, then they
need to bite the bullet and reflect on the foundations of their regulatory regimes. The puzzle then
becomes: how did both linearly different pathways uniquely fail?
The literature review establishes where the conversation about internet regulation began
and speaks about how that has either changed or stagnated. Chapter 1 opens with a review of the
origins of the preemptive and deregulatory frameworks that I define. The chapter couches these
frameworks in existing national principles and values. Next, it provides background on the
mutually exclusive nature of these frameworks by briefly citing the failed attempts of both sides
to pass legislation that would align them more with the opposing framework. This is done to
reify the unique nature of the puzzle: why did two mutually exclusive and linearly different
pathways yield the same result? Next, the literature review offers historical evidence of
radicalizing content abusing technology even before 1996. This demonstrates that the mutual
failure of both bodies is not easily explained by a lack of foresight. The framers of both bills
knew clearly that radicalizing content would be a problem after their regulation like it was before
it. Chapter 1 then moves away from the scholarly work about the bill’s passage and moves into
discussing the extremism that abuses the bill. The literature is clear that there is a demonstrable
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rise in violent extremism across many metrics. But the literature is split over whether there is a
causal link between extremism online and reciprocally manifested violence. Finally, I offer
scholarly background on the parts of each framework that I hypothesized were the reason for
each framework’s failure.
The research design I employed in answering this question needed to rule out certain
externalities. The implementation or statutory language of their attempts alone cannot be to
blame. Further, not knowing there was a problem that would need to be solved is not evidence of
failure. Therefore my evidence needed to prove that both bodies not only (1) suspected this
radicalization was a problem on the horizon but (2) drafted their original legislation in a way that
was wholly incongruous with their given policy priorities. At a basic level, I compared the
trajectory of their regulatory frameworks over time and the incentive structures created as a
result. At a higher level, I then offer ways that their frameworks (preemptive or deregulatory)
didn’t fit with the regulatory regime (the accompanying cast of political institutions or systems
used to support that framework) that surrounded it. This incongruous relationship between their
framework and regulatory regime allowed objectionable and radicalizing content to take root in
these gaps.
I argue in Chapter 2 that the E.U. made clear their intent to harmonize national laws and
recognized the transnationality of the internet; and yet, still chose to pass their hallmark piece of
legislation as a directive and not a regulation. Regulations align all applicable, underlying laws
and replace the existing law of each member state word-for-word. Directives, on the other hand,
can be implemented by member states with an unnecessarily generous amount of deference to
the will of the national legislature of each member state. Allowing for each E.U. member state to
maintain its own underlying criminal codes and set its own enforcement mechanisms makes
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regulating a transnational industry difficult. As a result of the lack of oversight by the E.U. upon
Germany’s transposition of the Directive to national law, Germany exacerbated the existing issue
of heckler’s vetoes. Heckler’s vetoes allow people to report counterspeech (well-intentioned
content that brings the debate closer to the mainstream and away from the fringe) and get it taken
down thereby allowing objectionable content to rise as a proportion of all content.
I argue in the U.S. chapter (Chapter 3) that Congress made clear its intent to prioritize
free speech considerations and to vest in the courts the power to ameliorate complaints. This
becomes a problem, however, because courts are reactive, not proactive. Without a regulatory
body to issue guidelines, this “court order standard” leaves no pathway for removing radicalizing
content until the harm has already been committed. The U.S. desire to have this industry be free
from proactive regulation but also clean enough for people to want to use social media and grow
the industry is incongruous. As a result of the blanket legal immunity and lack of a proactive
regulatory agent like the FCC to establish guidelines, ISPs are under no incentive to remove
objectionable content. Such content, therefore, increases in quantity even if it represents a
smaller proportion of all content.
Failing to do anything and continuing along with the status quo can only exacerbate both
the frequency with which objectionable content makes its way to impressionable eyes and the
power of platforms to resist future regulation by the state. But by critiquing the incongruous
regulatory regimes of two of the world’s preeminent beacons of democracy, I don’t mean to
signal that this is either an unsolvable problem or that the only solution is tighter government
control. In Chapter 4, I’ll briefly lay out the censorship of modern authoritarian countries to
demonstrate the other end of the spectrum. This chapter is meant to illustrate (1) the costs of
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having an open internet and (2) the fact that fully eliminating objectionable content and
maintaining democratic ideals are mutually exclusive.

6

Chapter 1: Literature Review
The “internet” has undoubtedly defined life in the late-20th and early-21st centuries. Its
regulation affects the way we transact business, conduct the functions of government, pass down
traditions, and connect with our communities during times of isolation. Suffice to say, the
internet has become integrated with arguably all previously analog interaction humans had with
the world around them. What largely differentiates the internet from other forms of
communication is that it is quickly translatable, instantly available, interactive, transnational
without additional infrastructure and exponentially evolving.
Although this combination has made the internet one of the most potent tools for change
(as evidenced by movements like the 2011 Arab Spring and #MeToo), the internet also has
proven to be a tool for radicalizing, organizing terror, and disseminating other generally
objectionable material. Intermediaries, like Twitter and Facebook, took center stage after it was
discovered that more and more extremist ideologies were using their sites to organize and
radicalize. Like any other industry, the fine line between the costs and benefits of this tool lay in
its regulation and oversight. Once the internet started to become commercially more accessible in
the late 1990s, Western governments conceptualized the regulation of online intermediaries in
two linear and mutually exclusive ways. On one hand, the United States passed the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996 and endorsed a deregulatory framework
(Kuczerawy 2015). Section 230 of the CDA immunizes internet service providers (ISPs) from
being responsible for monitoring or liable for hosting the content posted by their users. On the
other hand, the European Union passed the E-Commerce Directive (ECD) of 2000 and endorsed
a preemptive framework. Article 14 of the ECD holds intermediaries liable for the content
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created by their users once they are made aware that such content is illegal or objectionable
under certain guidelines (Keller 2018).
Academics in the field often use the term internet exceptionalism in conversations about
online intermediary liability and the regulation of speech on the internet. Interestingly, the term
has become co-opted by both frameworks and construed to fit their side. Representatives Chris
Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR), in 1995, used the term as a justification for passing their
“26 words that created the internet,” Section 230. They believed the untapped potential of the
internet would become a blossoming industry and a tool for change that justified the blanket
liability protections they were offering to ISPs (Kosseff 2019). To them, the internet didn’t need
to abide by the regulations that currently governed analog companies that provided the same
services (ie: newspapers, magazines, and books) (Bechtold 2020). On the other hand, the
European Commission used the same principle of internet exceptionalism to put the onus on ISPs
to police content. They recognized early that the internet was too complex and constantly
evolving for governments to keep up with and that only ISPs were able to police themselves and
therefore the liability should be on them to set enforceable standards and remove objectionable
content (Bechtold 2020).
Matthew Collins was an early supporter of a different argument all together with his 2001
book The Law of Defamation and the Internet. He argued that the medium shouldn’t make a
difference; to Collins, libel was still libel whether it was on a screen or in a newspaper. These
sites, to Collins, should be regulated commensurate with how their analog counterpart would be
with no additional onus on the government or the ISP. He was an early rejector of internet
exceptionalism, which is a stance that Neil Fried (2021) argues is becoming the modern norm.
Companies like Twitter, Facebook and Google are increasingly being called before Congress to
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answer questions about what they are doing to make the internet less toxic and objectionable.
Even Facebook could read the writing on the wall and acknowledged in a recent advertisement
campaign that their heyday of internet exceptionalism may be coming to a close. Facebook’s new
advertisements1 show pictures of technology in the 1990s and then a timeline with how that
technology has evolved and concludes with the title “The internet has changed a lot since 1996…
Facebook supports updated regulations.” Suffice to say, Collins’ refutation of internet
exceptionalism was foreshadowing the position the literature is in now – reconsidering fixes to
the 25-year old regulations because the content on the internet has become increasingly
objectionable.
Twenty-five years ago these ordinarily allied bodies chose two completely different
frameworks and that should rightfully come as a shock, but scholars explain this schism by
tracing a line back to the underlying principles of each side. Eliza Bechtold notes that such a
deregulatory framework is rooted in the “American tendency to value liberty over equality, a
staunch commitment to individualism, and an enduring tradition of negative freedom” (2020,
41). In stark contrast, she notes that Europe has historically preferred “the attachment of rights
and responsibilities to the enjoyment of individual rights, the imposition of positive obligations
on the government, and the balancing of the rights of an individual speaker with the rights of
others, including the targets of virulent speech” (42). To Damian Tambini, this American
conception of negative rights arose as a result of British colonial crackdowns on “speech, media,
and debate through censorship and particularly through taxation” and continues today as a result
of America’s incentive to be a hub of competition (2021, 301). Europe, on the other hand, is
scarred by the images of the private monopolization of the media that occurred during its quarrel
with fascism during World War II and their preemptive framework has continued today as a
1

https://www.ispot.tv/ad/OHcg/facebook-internet-regulations-remember-the-internet-in-96
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result of Europe’s interest in maintaining its status as a bastion of international human rights
enforcement (Tambini 2021). As a result of these disparate conceptualizations of protecting
liberty, Europe is proactive in putting the onus on intermediaries while the U.S. is more
deferential to platform expression (Bechtold 2020) (Julia-Barcelo and Koelman 2000).
Because of these fundamental disagreements over how a government should ensure the
protection of liberty, each side has been historically unable to bridge the divide and find a middle
ground. Each side has attempted to incorporate aspects of the other framework, but both times
failed. There will be a more comprehensive discussion in future chapters about these case
studies. But there is a body of literature that speaks to the way the American SESTA/FOSTA Act
of 2018 and the European Commission review of the E-Commerce Directive in 2010 represent
attempts to assimilate some of each other’s frameworks. However, they both uniquely failed to
achieve each of their desired policy goals as a result of institutional limitations within the U.S.
and European Union (Kuczerawy 2015) (Weisner 2020).
This kind of mutual exclusivity would lead to the belief that one side got it right and one
got it wrong. But in reality, both could be seen as a failure. Quantifying this failure has been a
meteoric rise of objectionable, radicalizing, and extremist content on the internet. The internet
was no stranger to this type of content before the enactment of the CDA and ECD, but neither
side has seen a reduction in extremist content as a result of their respective frameworks. Dating
all the way back to the 1980s, there existed groups like the Aryan Nation Liberty Net who used
dial-up technology to connect people to White Nationalist resources in their area (Conway et al.
3). Then in the early 90s, Stormfront came to prominence as one of the original platforms for
unadulterated xenophobic and racist extremism (Walther and McCoy 2021). The literature agrees
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that the internet has always had elements of being a breeding ground for radicalization and
extremism but not to the same extent as it exists today.
In the past five years, right-wing extremism has increased worldwide by almost 320%
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2019, 44). In an analysis of almost 70 years of extremism in
the United States, PIRUS data (Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States)
revealed that it took extremists an average of 18 months in 2005 to come across their first
radicalizing content but in 2016, they were coming across that same content an average of five
months faster (Jensen et al. 2018, 1). Daniel Koehler corroborates this sentiment with his
research on formerly radicalized extremists in Germany. His interviews illuminated the scope of
this issue. Not only was the internet effective in radicalizing users but it was considered the most
effective tool to do so. All of the formerly radicalized extremists interviewed labeled the internet
as the most frequent and most valuable tool they used to amass an army of supporters (Koehler
2014).
Despite the internet being a transnational apparatus, researchers have remarked that this
culture of digital hate, both past and present, is something uniquely Western (Ganesh 2018)
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2019). This is likely a result of the fact that two of the major
Eastern countries in the world (Russia and China) are synonymous with complete internet
censorship, an extreme that’s likely to reduce radical organizing but, in turn, runs wholly
opposed to the guiding principles of liberal democracy. The question still remains as to why
America and Germany both struggle uniquely with radicalization and extremism despite both of
them purportedly being some of the world’s leaders in internet regulation. Is there a link between
the regulation of the internet and the frequency of extremist terror? The literature is split but
leans in an unexpected direction.
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Bechtold explains that a country's approach to governing intermediaries is based on a
“framework of causation and harm.” Essentially she posits that Europe believes there is a
translation between extremist content online and instances of domestic terror, while America
believes that such a link is either nonexistent or outweighed by a greater factor (2020, 36).
Personally, she repeatedly sides with the American conceptualization and argues that there is no
strong causal link between online activity and domestic terror (Bechtold 2020). Walther and
McCoy (2021) support this; their research clarifies that while there was certainly an empirical
rise in the size of extremist groups on Telegraph after the Christchurch attacks in 2019, there was
still no causal link to say that the growth of these online groups was the cause of future attacks.
There is anecdotal evidence of things like copy-cats or other “inspirational” attacks, and there is
clear evidence of echo chambers being created when RWE (right-wing extremist) content is
reshared to similar people through the intermediary algorithms (Conway et al. 2019, 8).
But the literature has struggled to find a provable causality between the prevalence of
extremist language on the internet and occurrences of terror activity. Ganesh acknowledges that
such a causal link is yet to be proven but presents evidence that online speech is substantially
related “in limited cases” to the rise of terror activity (2018, 42). There has been overwhelming
evidence, like Guhl and Davey’s (2020) research of 208 white supremacy chat rooms, to prove
that online extremists often advocate for violence. But their research admittedly never yielded
any conclusive proof to suggest that these incitements materialized into actual violence. While
there is disagreement as to the totality of this lack of a causal link, the literature does seem to
largely support the American conceptualization of causation and harm which feels there is a
tenuous, if any, link between online extremist content and real-life terror activity.
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Despite this tenuous link, we would still expect that governments would feel obliged to
address it. Although scholars seem to feel the likelihood of online speech inciting violence is
low, the impact of such violence is unmistakably high. So why have both of the current models
failed to adequately address the exponentially growing problem of digital hate? It’s been
discussed how both are linearly different and mutually exclusive from each other, so we would
expect one extreme would fare better, even if just marginally, than the other. But that is
empirically not what scholars or citizens have noticed. As mentioned, extremism is at an all-time
high and rising in both the U.S. and the European Union. Each model has failed for three unique
reasons; acknowledging that both extremes have been a failure has become instrumental in the
way some scholars have begun to propose solutions.
One of the earliest failures of the deregulatory framework is how naively tailored it is.
Section 230 was originally imagined to govern one-on-one interactions. Representatives Wyden
and Cox drafted this section as a response to Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy (1995). The case held
that Prodigy was liable for the defamatory speech posted by its users against Mr. Belfort and his
company. Congress took issue with the effect this would have on the growth of a new industry
and essentially immunized the “middle man.” They wanted to steer litigation away from the host
of the speech and back between the one who said it and the one requesting redress for the speech.
Neither Cox, nor Wyden, nor any of the other early drafters imagined that this section would
eventually be cited in the proliferation of extremists and terror content. The scholarly work
published on intermediary liability between the years of 1997 and 2000 refers to Section 230 and
“defamation law” as one and the same (Friedman and Buono 2020) (Middendorf 1998)
(Sheridan 1997). Take as a counterpoint Professor Eric Goldman’s recent list of the top ten most
important Section 230 cases since then. Although anecdotal, the list demonstrates how expansive
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this issue has become. Of the ten cases, only three of them are concerned with person-to-person
defamation, and only one of those cases took place before 1999. The other seven cases concern:
copyright and trademark infringement, violent extremism, sexual assault, sex trafficking,
software contracts, online rental services, and search engines (Goldman 2017). The main section
only needed to be twenty-six words long because the framers of the section only imagined it
being used for cases similar to Prodigy. The overly broad language has since been construed to
protect dozens of sites hosting objectionable content.
In addition to institutional limitations, political limitations exist that have hindered the
U.S. deregulatory model. There has been a shift in the Overton Window that has come as a result
of Trump’s presidency. To Bechtold, these conceptions of “causation and harm” that differentiate
the two frameworks don’t necessarily have to be real. Her research speaks to the risk inflation
that is commonplace in the rhetorical toolbox of both the EU and the US. Both have incentives to
over-hype the risk of terror threats to suit their own policy agendas. Former President Trump has
routinely inflated international threats while downplaying the role of domestic terrorism
(Bechtold 2020). For example, his rhetoric simultaneously downplayed the risk of violence from
the Proud Boys while overinflating the risk of terrorism from the South in an effort to secure
more funding for his border wall (Walther and McCoy 2021). This rhetoric is blurring the line for
these groups; when the President of the United States downplays the role of the Proud Boys as a
terrorist organization, their speech moves farther from the margins of society, is considered more
acceptable in public discourse, and is tougher for intermediaries to police as extremist or
radicalizing (Conway 2020). Furthermore, intermediaries that choose to call out right-wing
politicians like Trump for underinflating the risk of certain domestic groups get labeled as
censoring conservative voices.
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It is well-documented by scholars that American conservatives encourage their supporters
to transition to more conservative-friendly alternative intermediaries, like Gab.ai or Parler, when
there is suspected censorship and these sites gradually become increasingly lax about content
standards with each migration and iteration (Ganesh 2018) (Conway et al. 2019) (Conway 2020)
(Walther and McCoy 2021). Therefore, as Ganesh argues, a potentially healthy discussion about
free speech on the internet is being held hostage by far-right populists that control the flow of
users that are “red-pilled” into believing that there is rampant censorship on mainstream
intermediaries (2018, 43). These reactionary sites being created, like Gab in 2017 as a response
to the December 2017 #TwitterPurge of some conservative commentators, are less interested in
working towards a healthier online discourse and unfortunately gain legitimacy with every
right-wing politician that joins the site (Walther and McCoy 2021). This creates a dangerous race
to the bottom that one could refer to as “intermediary Darwinism.” The sites that gain the most
users are the ones that offer the least stringent community guidelines and the least oversight,
therefore driving extremism farther and farther underground and out of the hands of more
mainstream sites that have a vested interest in appearing and being more socially responsible
(Conway et al. 2019).
A final barrier to the success of the deregulatory framework that arose in the literature is
that the American approach creates a slippery slope for technology firms to write their own
regulations. Contrary to the original purpose of the ECD which was to harmonize the laws
amongst member countries, the purpose of Section 230 in the U.S. was to bolster a nascent
industry (Kightlinger 2003) (Kosseff 2019). Because of the broad immunity these intermediaries
are afforded in the name of internet exceptionalism, they are able to simultaneously maintain
more of a user base and spend less on moderating content. The American deregulatory system is
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inherently capitalist and social responsibility has taken a back seat to profit maximization. The
American intermediary industry was able to blossom with the protections of Section 230 and
their wealth and influence exponentially grew by both providing a quasi-public resource and by
emphasizing the complexity of their industry. Despite the sector's immense wealth, they are so
influential in setting their own regulation because they provide an invaluable service to the
government. Coordination with the U.S. intelligence community and other surveillance-related
national interests are often cited as a reason to overlook the sector's monopolistic tendencies,
economically inefficient copyright protections, and undemocratic commercialization of essential
digital services (Popiel 2018). Cusumano et al agree adding that the government has progressed
down this slippery slope so far that they’ve largely lost control of the content on the internet
(2021). Especially with the Federal government being preoccupied with the recent pandemic,
“big tech” has been given even more fuel to grow beyond the regulatory reach of national or
international governments (Jacobides 2020).
Second, the industry contains a bias towards institutional knowledge. Due to the complex
nature of the technology sector, there exists a pervasive “revolving door” where regulators often
come from the industry and vice versa (Gilens and Page 2014, 567; Popiel 2018, 575). This is
another tool used by the industry to regulate themselves, placing their former employees within
the regulatory agencies and recruiting former regulators to work in the private sector.
Interestingly, one check on this power offered in the literature is that these firms are still
beholden to the court of public opinion. Mehra and Trimble (2014) argue that intermediaries like
Facebook and Twitter ended up voluntarily complying with a variety of the provisions in the bills
they’ve lobbied against out of an interest to keep a positive appearance with their user base but
only the provisions that suit their needs and demonstrate a willingness to ‘take action’ on the
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problem. That being said, there is still a large disconnect between the entitlement felt by
intermediaries and the dwindling power of the government that allows these digital hate cultures
to grow (Ganesh 2018).
Although the European model imposes more constraining (and therefore controlling)
obligations upon intermediaries, the preemptive framework isn’t without its flaws. Underlying
principles of “sovereignty and subsidiarity” drive the European Union to enact many of its
internet regulations as voluntary initiatives or frameworks whose implementation is up to
individual member states (Bechtold 2020). One of the most well-known clarifications in the
E-Commerce Directive is the “country of origin” clause that states every intermediary is subject
to the level of implementation in their domiciled country (Kightlinger 2003). This means if
Twitter.eu was domiciled in France, the content hosted on their site is accessible anywhere in
Europe but would be subject to the moderation requirements that France implemented whether
that be equal to or more stringent than the baseline standards set in the Directive. Inherently, no
country wants to become the host for objectionable sites. This creates another dangerous race to
the bottom where countries are incentivized to each develop gradually more and more stringent
moderation requirements in excess of the minimums set by the Directive to avoid becoming the
haven for objectionable sites (Bechtold 2020). This constantly tightening regulatory regime
incentivizes platforms to flee to the US and more content to be driven underground through an
increasing number of alternative platforms like Gab and Parler.
Another reason why the European model has failed to keep objectionable discourse from
permeating their sites is that their preemptive framework creates a perverse incentive for
“heckler’s vetoes.” Heckler’s vetoes are a byproduct of the “notice and takedown” clause within
the E-Commerce Directive. Sites are only immunized insofar as they remove material that is
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made known to them to be illegal (Keller 2018). This framework establishes a vague standard for
what is considered a “notice,” however, and intermediaries are incentivized to “automatically and
systematically'' remove content relating to any notice filed. These act as “heckler’s vetoes” that
greatly restrict the growth of intermediaries, the flow of verified information, and the functioning
of democracy (Julia-Barcelo and Koelman 2000). But more importantly to the original design of
the ECD, these heckler’s vetoes incentivize extremist groups to “report” credible information and
then inundate the platform’s marketplace of ideas with their own conceptions of reality (Ganesh
and Bright 2020). This “anticipatory obedience” deprives the government of needing to pass
actual laws to justify the content being taken down and users that post credible information often
don’t have an opportunity to contest the removal creating an oversaturation of
incorrect/objectionable content with an undersaturation of peer-reviewed content (Bechtold
2020).
The final barrier that scholars offer to the European preemptive framework’s success is
that the European Union doesn’t have clearly defined criteria for “terrorism” to equally apply.
Ever since 9/11, the UN and international human rights NGOs have repeatedly issued warnings
that the overly broad definition of terrorism is a danger to the freedom of expression (Bechtold
2020). The extreme right is “composed of a fast-changing and complex overlapping of
individuals, groups, movements, political parties and media organs” making them particularly
hard to root out as a group (Conway 2020, 1). Although not a domestic terror organization, the
case study of ISIS and the Taliban in the mid-2010s proves this point. ISIS was a much more
defined group that was agreed upon as a terrorist group by the international community. On the
other hand, the Taliban was comparatively less organized and less agreed upon as a terrorist
group at the time and was able to flourish on social media as a result. Because of this disparity,
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Facebook was able to curtail reportedly 99% of ISIS recruitment content by late-2017 and
Twitter was able to report similar while Taliban recruitment content was able to flourish as a
result of the fact that they don’t neatly fit into the organized parameters of objectionable content
as defined in the EU (Conway 2020) (Walther and McCoy 2021). This lack of a clear definition
for terrorism in Europe stems from the same rationale for why the US might inflate or deflate
threats – to malleably suit their given policy priorities.
Evidently, the models have had their problems, but why is this important? Scholars have
come to agree that the largest impact of these framework failures is on democracy. They
forewarn that bolstering extremist content and simultaneously driving it underground will have
deleterious effects on our ability to interact with basic democratic functions. Ganesh (2018)
warns that in a general sense, not dealing with this culture of digital will alienate populations and
accelerate support for autarkic and isolationist policies that will curtail the soft power of global
liberal democracy. Furthermore, Walther and McCoy (2021) warn that letting ideological,
alternative sites like Gab and Parler go unchecked leaves voters susceptible to information
manipulation by both domestic political interests and foreign actors. The biggest problems for
Europe given the cracks arising in their framework is that their “notice and takedown” clause
will result in heckler’s vetoes that lead to censorship and that the race to the bottom created
through the “nation of origin rule” will lead to more and more sites being driven underground.
Similarly, the most pressing impact on American democracy is that ideological alternative sites
will continue to pop up as a reaction to intermediaries challenging politicized risk deflation and
that the internet will generally become a repository for objectionable material as companies try to
maximize profits.
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In summary, the internet has developed into an exceedingly powerful tool. Intermediaries
have an immense ability to disseminate information and change the way we interact with the
world around us. Previously, we conceptualized the internet as exceptional and requiring a
unique set of rules different from its analog counterparts, but that school of thought has
disappeared as conservatives allege censorship among mainstream platforms and progressive
liberals demand more action be taken to reduce the amount of objectionable content hosted
online. The intermediaries themselves are even seeing a change in the tide and are beginning to
adapt to it. So the question arises, “how did we get to this point?” Despite their mutually
exclusive and linearly different approaches to regulating online intermediaries, why have both
the U.S. and the E.U. largely failed to curb the rise of extremism on social media? In describing
the way that each side has (1) failed to find a middle ground and (2) actually created perverse
incentives for intermediaries and users to act irresponsibly, this thesis seeks to challenge the way
the two frameworks actually fit into the larger regimes (courts, jurisdictions, structures, etc)
around them. Maybe it was adequate at slowing extremism’s rise when the scope of the internet
was smaller, but it no longer is now that the internet is more complex and covers more than just
defamation like originally assumed. At risk is the fate of democracy and our ability as a polity to
know what is true and what is propaganda.
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Chapter 2: Germany
To Piter and his friends, trips to the Arena Bar and Cafe in Hanau, Germany were a staple
of their post-workout routine. As he recounts, he brought a slice of pizza from around the corner
on the night of February 19, 2020 into the bar and searched for his friends. Shortly after sitting
down, the group was jolted by a singular shot which he, Momo, and many other bar patrons all
report to believe was a blank from a fake gun or part of a prank going on outside. Unbeknownst
to them, this was neither harmless nor concluded. Seconds later, an unmasked man burst into the
Arena Bar and Cafe with four handguns and opened fire. He recounts that the kiosk and host area
was the first target and the gunman made his way towards the back of the restaurant. Three of
Piter’s friends were killed at the front of the restaurant and his other friend Momo, was shot in
the shoulder next to Piter. Piter jumped on top of Momo and another patron jumped on top of
Piter to hide behind a bar table. The gunman continued shooting what was later reported to be
four handguns and, per eyewitness testimony, he emptied the magazines before walking out
calmly. When the rampage was over, Piter was relieved to hear Momo. However, he was
distraught in discovering that the patron on top of him had died as a result of shielding Piter from
the spray of bullets. Of Piter’s group, only Piter and Momo survived and Piter was the only
patron in the busy cafe to come out unharmed.
The gunman was later identified to be 43-year-old German, Tobias Rathjen. Rathjen
arrived at the Arena Bar and Cafe after already killing a taxi driver and opening fire at another
predominantly-Turkish bar across the river. Rathjen’s story ends when he is discovered at home,
dead alongside his mother in an apparent murder-suicide. But the story for the Hanau community
and the fourteen victims begins much earlier when he posted his xenophobic and conspiratorial
manifesto online and a YouTube video alleging the existence of a secret surveillance operation in
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Germany that he purports to have discovered online. Not only was he radicalized by the content
posted by others before him, but his own content (YouTube channel and personal website) would
remain online for days after the attack. It was eventually removed, but not before the dark
corners of the internet cached his content and disseminated it out of the mainstream.2
In his manifesto, he alleges that there are ethnic groups that threaten Germanic purity but
that they cannot be expelled legally (alluding to Germany’s ongoing acceptance of millions of
refugees). He lists off many Southeast Asian Middle Eastern nations explaining that they will
have to be expelled manually and that it is his job to maintain the rights of ethnic Germans even
if it meant not only killing millions of immigrants but also the Germans who supported the
policies that allowed their arrival. Rathjen was a known far-right extremist, whose ideas closely
align with groups like the Identitarian Movement that have been known to infiltrate and coopt
mainstream hashtags to slip xenophobic content by ordinary detection.3 Unfortunately, Rathjen’s
radicalization and ability to find similarly xenophobic Germans to support his aggression is not
unique. Right-wing extremism is an issue so pervasive to German society that Interior Minister
Horst Seehofer proclaimed it to be not only at its highest level since 2001 but more alarmingly
“the greatest threat to security in our country.”4 Rathjen was not a singular “bad apple,” but
rather a momentary window into the larger, tainted farm.

2

Keys, Matthew. 2020. “Frankfurt Attack Suspect Posted Manifestos, YouTube Videos before Shooting Spree.” The
Desk. https://thedesk.net/2020/02/tobias-rathjek-manifesto-attack-terrorism-germany-frankfurt-hanau/ (March 24,
2022).
3
Scholz, Kay-Alexander. 2020. “How the Internet Fosters Far-Right Radicalization.” Deutsche Welle.
https://www.dw.com/en/how-the-internet-fosters-far-right-radicalization/a-52471852 (March 24, 2022).
4
Gehrke, Laurenz. 2021. “Germany Records Highest Level of Right-Wing Extremist Crime in 20 Years.”
POLITICO.
https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-records-highest-level-of-right-wing-extremist-crimes-in-20-years/ (March
24, 2022).
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History of Domestic Radicalization
In response, a critical reader could argue that Rathjen was a “lone wolf” and that his
radicalization is (1) not evidence of a pervasive or systematic blunder in online content
moderation and (2) equally possible under a traditional medium like radio, television,
newspapers, or books. However, such an argument fails to account for the unique features of the
internet – those features which incidentally also make the internet so popular and valuable to
society, the medium’s ability to amplify and reproduce content. Contrary to radio or television,
social media allows for the amplification of material beyond their original transmission. In
contrast to traditional information mediums, social media allows unvetted users to not only share
with large audiences but repackage the information and disguise it in new ways. One user’s
allegation of “conspiracy” within the government could lead five more users to confirm that
‘belief,’ three more to add onto it with additional and typically false information, six more to
reshare it to their circles, and a handful who will migrate that content to different platforms.
The process gets out of hand, a movement is given credence, and well-intentioned
content (called ‘counterspeech’) is unable to dilute the inflammatory, outlandish rhetoric. As a
result, an unquantifiable number of larger plots exist representing systematic radicalization
opportunities that thrive outside of the public eye. Rathjen was a lone wolf in this attack, but the
only reason we know about him is because his plot was unfortunately successful. The amplifying
and reproductive characteristics of the internet not only creates pathways for the rise of lone
wolves like existed pre-internet, but now also connects lone wolves to each other in a clandestine
ecosystem (Hamm and Spaaij, 2017). In 2017, Germany saw the actualization of such a
phenomenon previously inapplicable to traditional mediums (ie: radio, television, newspapers).
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Starting in 2015, a user on Telegram named Hannibal began a forum that invited police
and military officers to connect. Innocuous as it may sound, it would soon take a turn for the
worst. The conversation gradually shifted away from job-related bantor when Hannibal started
provoking xenophobic, anti-immigrant rhetoric within the forum. Eventually, the group grew, the
well-intentioned officers left the forum, and the group became highly concentrated with
xenophobic, anti-immigrant members of the German defense forces. By early 2016, this group
had reached the upper echelons of the KSK (a German equivalent to the Navy Seals) and other
exclusive branches of the German military. Eventually a rumor is started that there is going to be
an overthrow of the government on a certain day, called Day X, in which the government will be
completely overwhelmed at the mercy of immigrants and pro-immigrant politicians who had
allegedly been coordinating this from within the German government for years. This is a motif to
what Q’Anon dubs “the storm.” These former and current military members begin stockpiling
weapons and communicating with each other about how they will rendezvous on the day of the
event and kidnap the pro-immigrant politicians to prevent them from executing their alleged
plan.
By late 2016, plans had been codified and rehearsed for kidnapping these politicians,
routing out immigrants, and protecting Germany from the ethnic pollution that they alleged
would come from allowing non-natives to settle in Germany. Members of the conspiracy
established other branches elsewhere in Germany and began stashing weapons in strategic
locations. Later, court documents would reveal that members of this group were going so far as
to case the houses of targeted politicians. The group started off as an outlet for military members
and police officers to converse and has now, with the help of Telegram, has reached
exponentially more people than a singular radio broadcast or newspaper ever could. The forum
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became a nexus for previously unaffiliated lone wolves to collaborate and give credence to each
other's beliefs with an efficiency nonexistent in the days before the internet. From here, Franco A
enters the picture. Hannibal got the group started, but Franco was Hannibal’s “boots on the
ground” coordinating logistics and resources for the impending Day X. It wasn’t until a handgun
was found in the wall of the Vienna International Airport men’s bathroom in 2017 that this plot
would begin to unravel. German government institutions investigated the group and uncovered
how unsettlingly deep it went. High ranking military members in many of Germany’s elite
branches were discovered to have been involved in this plot against left-wing politicians.
Although this plot was foiled, Day X and its de facto leaders Hannibal and Franco A
serve to prove the point that the internet is a place that can uniquely bring together average
citizens to do terrible things. Previously, large scale efforts of terror and disruption required an
organizing force like a terrorist group or other non-state actor, but (as I’ll further elaborate in
Chapter 3) this is no longer the case. Average people are finding comfort and validation amongst
others who confirm their unorthodox beliefs. In many ways, Day X is analogous to the
insurrection that occurred on January 6th at the U.S. Capitol. The insurrection was also a
congregation of predominantly unaffiliated, lone wolf rioters that were inspired by the rhetoric
on sites like Gab to assemble at a location and form ad hoc affiliations with each other based on
this shared goal. The internet is uniquely creating an ecosystem for people to not only reach a
larger number of people than ever before, but more unfortunately receive feedback from other
fringe users that confirms their conspiratorial ideas.
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Date

Incident

Casualties

Platforms Used

June 8

Christchurch Copycat
A 21-year-old from Hildesheim
posted in an online chat forum that
he intended to kill as many
Muslims as possible and referenced
recordings of the live-streamed
Christchurch Mosque Massacre in
2019.

His plot was
foiled and he
currently stands
trial for
“preparing a
state-endangerin
g act of
violence”

Undisclosed
chat forum,
Facebook

Hanau Shootings
See above.

Nine (9) dead,
at least five (5)
wounded

Personal web
domain,
YouTube
Twitch, AWS,
Kohlchan

2020

February 19

2019

2018

October 9

Halle Synagogue Attack
Stephan Balliet attempted an attack
on a synagogue on Yom Kippur.

Two (2) dead,
three (3) injured

June 2

Death of Council President
Walter Lubcke
Lubcke was killed at close range by
an unaffiliated, lone wolf gunman
who had previously been
radicalized by and posted
radicalizing videos to YouTube.

One (1) dead

YouTube

Stabbing in Chemnitz
Suspect later identified as “Alaa S.”
stabs a man in Chemnitz and
(before the police could issue their
report) social media alleges that the
crime was a result of immigrants.
Rumors spread quickly online and
inspired neo-Nazi’s and far-right
One (1) dead,
extremists to take to the streets in
twenty-three
protest. AfD politicians churned up
(23) injured
unsupported rumors and
anti-Immigrant sentiment and
called the attack a “knife
migration.” Hundreds of right-wing
protestors take to the streets, riot,
damage properties, enact Nazi
salutes, and chase immigrants
around the city.

Various
platforms

Stabbing in Kandel
Afghan refugee stabs his
ex-girlfriend and extremist sites
exploit the incident on social media

Various
platforms

August 26

December 27

One (1) dead,
but unknown
numbers of
refugees injured
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to fuel xenophobic sentiments,
denounce Germany’s mirgration
policy, and instigate violence
against refugees.

August 25

Indymedia Ban
The Ministry of the Interior bans
linksunten.indymedia.org, a known
far-left organization with a history
of inspiring violence and
inflammatory riots. The site took to
various other platforms to plead
that it was being censored. They
riled up their base and asked that
500 show up to protest the
decision. Police showed up to keep
order at the protest and 1,600
protestors showed up and threw
bottles and rocks at police.

Thirteen (13)
injured

July 28

Hamburg supermarket stabbing
A man went on a stabbing rampage
in a supermarket in Hamburg. He
became absorbed in ISIS
propaganda online (mainly videos).

One (1) dead,
six (6) wounded

2017

Personal web
domain, various
platforms

YouTube

Figure 1: Selected domestic terrorism attacks (or foiled plans) perpetrated with the help of radicalizing content
online (Source: German Counter Extremism Project5)

A Defensive Democratic Model
Philosophically, the attack in Hanau, the near success of Franco A and these other
domestic terror attacks should come as a shock to scholars of Germany and other Germanophiles
who revere the defensive democratic model that the country has boasted since the introduction of
its post-WWII constitution in 1949. “Defensive democracies” ensure the protection of the state
by limiting certain rights and freedoms. Gross (2003) summarizes the sentiment of defensive
democracies in writing, “Democracy places human rights at the heart of its philosophy, however,
without security there can be no rights” (122). Things like criminalizing Holocaust denial are
5

“Germany: Extremism and Terrorism.” Counter Extremism Project.
https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/germany (March 16, 2022).
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hallmarks of defensive democracies. On the other hand, liberal democracies like the United
States would more affirmatively enshrine one’s right to their own ideas and set the bar very high
before it allows a necessary government intervention.6 Liberal democracies do this in the interest
of having the free marketplace of speech dilute extremism and unwanted content in civil
discourse. The bar is lower in defensive democracies, like Germany. Defensive democracies
prioritize rooting out that speech rather than trusting the free marketplace of ideas to dilute it.
In Germany, this defensive democracy is on display constitutionally and institutionally in
addition, to statutorily like mentioned with the criminalization of Holocaust denials. Article 9 of
the German Constitution, in contrast to the First Amendment in the U.S. Constitution, codifies
the idea that freedom of assembly can be restricted from people whose aim is hostility towards
the Constitution. Even more expansively, Article 18 allows the government to suspend any
previously aforementioned “basic rights” (Articles 5, 8, 9, 10, 14, or 16) like freedom of speech
and of the press if a German is found to be using those rights to advance disorder against the
state or the Constitution. Pursuant to these ends, the government has state institutions like the
Office for the Protection of the Constitution (“Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz”, or BfV)
whose task is similar to that of the U.S. F.B.I and specializes in surveilling for instances of
attacks against the constitution and the national cohesion it provides. Contrary to the mechanisms
used for maintaining constitutional hegemony in the U.S. and other liberal democracies,
Germany and other defensive democracies operate uniquely by preemptively curtailing the rights
of individuals or groups that wish to disrupt the democratic order.

6

For example, see Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) (“The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”)
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Germany’s Preemptive Regulatory Regime
Parallel to this defensive democratic model is the regulatory regime Germany uses to
govern online intermediaries, or sites that host the speech of users online. This European, and
especially German, regulatory structure is what I define as the preemptive framework; such is
defined in juxtaposition to what I will define as the deregulatory framework that exists in the
United States to govern the same sites. This chapter will explore the European preemptive
framework using Germany as a case study and argue that haphazard oversight and vague
statutory language created a perverse incentive to remove counterspeech. To do so, this chapter
will critically analyze the major pieces of legislation enacted to address speech hosted by
intermediaries. Throughout such analysis, attention will be paid to the ways each iteration's
language or implementation could be co-opted to unintentionally allow objectionable and
radicalizing content to reach its intended audience and simultaneously dilute the stock of
legitimate information that could refute it.
The legislative line will start in 1997 with the Tele Services Act and point out what the
European conceptualization of the internet looked like at its infancy. After that, the European
Union’s E-Commerce Directive (ECD) of 2000 was passed in an attempt to harmonize national
attempts at regulating the internet, but I’ll argue that both it’s language and implementation
actually muddied the waters from an early point of regulating this transnational industry. The
ECD would be implemented by Germany through the Tele Media Act of 2007, substantially
updated with the NetzDG of 2017 and then tweaked with a recent 2021 amendment. In the
timeline, the ECD was the pivotal point and the focus in examining the post-ECD legislation is
to point out how some language would get updated but that principles that underscored the
Directive continue to plague future iterations of intermediary regulation that stem from it.
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1997

Teledienstegesetz (The “Tele Services Act”)

TSA

2000

Directive 2000/31/EC (The “E-Commerce Directive”)

ECD

2002

Deadline for Member States to transpose the ECD

2007

Telemediengesetz (The “Tele Media Act”)

TMA

2017

Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz

NetzDG

Figure 2: Acronyms and dates associated with the below discussion of the German intermediary liability regime
over time

The Tele Services Act of 1997 (Teledienstegesetz)
The Tele Services Act, or TSA, was successful in showing Germans that traditional
media roles could map to the internet, but was not particularly successful in showing them
specifically how. As Professor Determann writes in 1999, Germans and the ISPs (internet service
providers7) around the world that hosted content for them anxiously awaited how Germany
would adapt their 1996 Telecommunications Act (Telekommunikationsgesetz) and earlier pieces
of legislation to the internet. Not only did Germany have to respond to the
monumentally-important and recently passed U.S. Communications Decency Act of 1996 but
also international outrage over the case of Felix Somm.

Case of Felix Somm
Felix Somm was the managing director at CompuServe Deutschland (CSD), a subsidiary
of the U.S. company, CompuServe (CS). CS was a popular American site that “newsgroups”
could rent space from and publish their stories and content. CS maintained the contracts with
7

ISSs (Information Society Services) was the original terminology in European regulation. For the sake of clarity
when comparing U.S. and European regulation, I will be referring to ISSs as ISPs going forward. The terms
encompass the same category of internet publishers but ISP is the term that has become more widely accepted in the
modern day.
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these newsgroups and handled all of the logistics of such an arrangement to get the content
online and edit it at the bequest of their newsgroups. CSD merely operated the telephone line that
transmitted the data from CS in America to Germans that were requesting newsgroup content. In
December 1995, prosecutors in Munich handed CSD a list of 282 newsgroups that they alleged
were publishing unlawful material (child pornography and extreme violence). Felix Somm told
his counterpart at CS who then blocked access to these sites. CS didn’t find any evidence of child
pornography or violence, but blocked access to the 282 groups at the request of Munich
prosecutors. American consumers were up in arms; they poured German beer into the sewers in
front of CompuServe’s San Francisco headquarters and threatened to terminate their membership
to the service.8 In response, CS unblocked all but five of them and implemented “Cyber Patrol”
to prevent German minors from being able to see the 277 newly-unblocked groups. The German
prosecutors brought charges against Somm because child pornography was still illegal in
Germany even for adults, there was a likelihood that the content had been cached and
republished by other newsgroups despite the blocking, and, they alleged, as executive of CSD it
was his negligence that made him an accomplice. He was tried and sentenced to two years of
probation.

Tele Services Act as a Remedy
In 1997, the Bundestag passed the Tele Services Act in an attempt to clarify the legal
environment, as their documents reveal, to create plentiful and “long lasting jobs” with more
companies staying in Germany. Clarifying the liability for online intermediaries, to them, would
prevent another situation like what happened to Mr. Somm and CSD. They made sure, also in an
8

Kossel, Axel. 1997. “CompuServe Reagiert Auf Porno-Anklage (CompuServe Responds to Porn Accusations).”
Heise Online. https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/CompuServe-reagiert-auf-Porno-Anklage-9112.html
(March 15, 2022).
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apparent nod to the case, to distinguish this law from their Telecommunications Act and the State
Broadcasting Treaty due to the interactive nature of this new medium. Somm’s liability if he was,
for example, the managing director at a news station would be different than if he was the
managing director at CSD. At a news station, he can cease distribution of illegal material upon
receipt of its illegality. But at CSD, the content he made available was not being requested or
directed by him nor was it under his sole control; anyone could request it at any time even if he
didn’t want them to and the material could be copied ad infinitum. The legislature recognized
this in affording him and CSD more protections.
Section 5 of the TSA codifies this fact. ISPs that “make available” content are more liable
than those who strictly “provide access.” In the scope of this case, CS “makes available” content
and CSD strictly “provides access.” CS was the only one that could shut down access at the root
and CSD was merely a pipeline facilitating the access. Upon appeal, Somm was acquitted under
the retroactive provisions of the TSA and his ISP (CompuServe Deutschland) was immunized
against the content of the users to which they “provide access.” If CS was based in Germany and
Somm was the leader, as Professor Determann explains, it would have been a different story.
Providers that “make available” content are immunized under the TSA from civil liability as long
as they don’t have knowledge of the content, are technically unable to remove it, or cannot be
“reasonably expected” to block the use of certain content. The latter two are seemingly a final
nod to the Somm case where CSD argued at trial that they neither could remove nor block access
to the content because of caching and CS-ownership of the content, respectively. The case gets
more complex in such a thought experiment where CS is based in Germany and CSD didn’t
exist, but the central premise here remains: the TSA recognized the fact that the internet was
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different from other previously governed mediums like broadcasts and therefore necessitated
room to grow and less liability.
Although the TSA did provide value in clarifying the application of traditional media
roles to this new frontier, it still represents a window into Europe’s early conceptualization of the
internet. First, the act defines teleservices as any communication services that uses
“combinations of characters, images, or sounds” – certainly not the most nuanced or scalable
definition. In defining “teleservices,” the act conceptualized the primary examples of such to be
“tele banking” and “data exchange;” the first of which is comically representative of the
portmanteauing that characterized nascent internet knowledge and the second of which referred
to sharing raw data back and forth. Along the same vein, the act only defined two actors: users
and providers. At this point, the internet was understood as a linear transaction where users ask
to see something on their screen and providers provided it. This act serves as a primary source
and a screenshot of the early understanding of the internet; the German citizens that made up the
Bundestag had limited experience with the internet and their understanding of its scope reflected
as such.

Tele Services Act as a Primary Source
In addition to this act being a primary source for early internet naivete, the TSA also
stands to represent the starting point for intermediary liability in Germany. An important part of
this act is how it reflects the starting point for future debates about hosting, caching, and, most
relevantly, being a “mere conduit.” These are the three legal classifications that would develop
for ISPs. ISPs are considered hosts if their information is stored permanently and they strictly
provide the space for it to reside. ISPs are considered eligible for caching safe harbors if it logs
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user transmissions for a finite, but not insignificant amount of time in the interest of making
things like loading speeds faster. “Mere conduit” sites are most relevant to the discussion of
radicalizing content online. “Mere conduits” are ISPs that strictly transmit the information
provided by users to facilitate the transaction to another user or users. This represents a linear
scale of not only ISP capability but more importantly ISP liability under this regime.
It’s easier for a hosting site to lose its liability than a site operating as a “mere conduit”
because of the level of heightened involvement hosts have in amplifying the content.
Modern-day ISPs are tough to lock into singular categories because of their diversification, but a
simplified way to consider these distinctions is that sites like Whatsapp, Instagram, Facebook,
Twitter, and Reddit are predominantly “mere conduits” or hosts (depending on the functionality
of the communication) whereas services like Amazon Web Services could be classified as
predominantly a caching service. The TSA doesn’t make much of a distinction between hosts
and caching services (even though the two have become more delineated and clearly divided
today) but does distinguish hosts/caching from “mere conduit” ISPs in its use of “provide
access” and “make available,” respectively.
This first iteration of Germany’s intermediary regulation gave blanket immunity to mere
conduits (Section 5.3) but gave caveats to the immunity of hosts/caching services (Section 5.2).
But even then, the caveats for host/caching services are generous: “Providers shall not be
responsible for any third-party content which they make available for use unless they have
knowledge of such content and are technically able and can reasonably be expected to block the
use of such content.” To escape liability under this early act, ISPs like CS (if they were based in
Germany) would just have to prove that (1) they didn’t know it existed or (2) if they knew the
objectionable content existed that they couldn’t technically block it or be expected to block it. If
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the Somm case was initiated after the passage of the TSA, the prosecutors couldn’t allege that the
content was going to be copied ad infinitum by other newsgroups as a reason to hold Somm
negligent; such an argument would actually give Somm and CSD an easy case to prove that
moderating this specific content was not possible with the technology available to them at the
time and therefore should be instead immunized.
As it should be abundantly clear, these laws and the act of defining stakeholders,
enumerating their liabilities and choosing their exemptions within those laws becomes very
complex. To boot, this process was, at the same time, playing out in fourteen other EU member
states. Granted, there was likely some level of coordination between certain countries on what
language to use and that might work well for the regulation of crop production or fuel-efficiency
standards, but the internet is different. The internet is a constantly evolving, simultaneously
occurring, instantaneously arriving, decentralized, transnational industry. The European Union
saw the writing on the wall that such an industry would be economically stifled if forced to abide
by potentially fifteen different regulatory regimes. The European Union took action (although
not in a way that retrospectively was good for the internet).

E-Commerce Directive of 2000 (2000/31/EC)
Shortly after the passage of the TSA, the European Commission proposed to the
European Council and Parliament a directive to harmonize “certain legal aspects of electronic
commerce in the internal market.”9 Recital 40 is of particular note in proving the oxymoronic
nature of this endeavor. Recital 40 of the E-Commerce Directive, or Recital 16 as included in the
original proposal, articulates the mutually beneficial nature of rectifying a balkanized legal
environment for both member states and ISPs. Through their recitals and legislative journals, the
9
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European Commission, Parliament and Council all repeatedly emphasize the importance of
transnational legislation. They cite different reasons throughout (ie: economic gain, citizen
protection, effective member state prosecution, international competitiveness, etc.) but all make
note that there is a need for legislation that brings together “existing and emerging disparities in
Member States' legislation and case-law.”10 Therein lies the puzzle: if unifying legal regimes was
the policy priority, what was the utility in passing this governance as a directive rather than a
regulation?
Directives leave the implementation of codified policy goals up to the member states
whereas regulations directly implement binding legislation that must be enacted in their entirety
by the member state. Both of which have value, but different value. It’s in this choice to pass
such governance as a directive that I argue the European Union set itself up for decades of
ineffective content oversight. By opting for a directive, the European Union allowed member
states to continue the asymmetric regulation between member states the governance sought to
address. First, this chapter will explain the provisions of the E-Commerce Directive as it was
passed and then the incongruities between it and future German national legislation. By tracing
the iterations of Germany’s national legislation which was passed to implement this directive, it
becomes clear that the directive empowered the omission of both procedural specificity and
governance structure that allowed many loopholes and vague language to arise. These textual
missteps made it difficult to systematically enforce content standards.
The E-Commerce Directive has more than 60 recitals (contextual statements about the
legislative intent) and 23 articles but the majority of which govern the logistics surrounding its
four major, substantive articles (Article 12-15). Articles 12-14 govern the three classifications of
intermediaries and Article 15 prohibits member states from requiring ISPs to actively monitor for
10
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objectionable content. The impact of my larger argument about objectionable content relates to
the accessibility of radicalizing content on social media ISPs, and not so much the impact these
laws have on, for example, government action against ISPs (like Amazon Web Services) that
domestic terror cells may use to share documents internally. Because of this, Articles 12, 14, and
15 of are particular importance while Article 13 about caching does not bear much relevance to
the argument about radicalizing content on social media platforms
Article 12 of the E-Commerce Directive addresses the liability standards that should be
imposed by member states on ISPs that act as “mere conduits,” like Whatsapp or Telegram.
Again, this is where information is provided by a user and not stored by the ISP in any additional
way or for longer than directed by the user to facilitate that communication. It specifies that ISPs
are not liable for the user content that they facilitate the transmission of so long as the ISP
doesn’t initiate the transmission, select the receiver of the transmission, or modify the
transmission in form or content.11 Content posted on “hosts”, like Facebook or Reddit, have a
larger reach and the content is visible for longer, so Article 14 imposes a more stringent standard
of liability on hosts. Article 14 establishes guidelines for member states to govern sites like
Facebook, Reddit, 4chan, Twitter, Parler and Gab – defined collectively as “hosts.” Hosts are
immune from civil liability so long as they (1) did not have “actual knowledge” of the illegal
material or (2) failed to remove the material “expeditiously” after receiving notice12. The first
part of which naturally raises two central questions of internet content moderation. First, if a site
wants to remain immune, can it simply not open its eyes in search of content violations? Second,
what defines “actual knowledge?” If the content violation exists on its site and the ISP is the
omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent force overseeing its users then it hypothetically could have
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knowledge of any piece of content at a given time. This is precisely where Article 15 clears the
air. In the interests of fostering the growth of ISPs and reducing their administrative burden,
Article 15 puts the onus of content moderation on users and third-parties to report. Article 15 (1)
enumerates, “Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers... to monitor the
information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or
circumstances indicating illegal activity.”13 As mentioned, the Directive was implemented to both
harmonize legal regimes for the growth of the ISP sector and also prevent the proliferation of
objectionable material. These immunities, or “safe harbors” as they are also called, insufficiently
clarified the legal environment for ISPs and failed to offer codified protections for the consumer
in the form of content moderation guidelines.

How was the E-Commerce Directive toothless from the start?
Both the message and the medium of the E-Commerce Directive would later present
themselves as obstacles to responsible content moderation and the protection of consumers. As it
relates to the message (textual failures), I argue that the text of the Directive offers a variety of
protections to ISPs but lacks three reciprocal mechanisms established in the U.S. DMCA that
would protect consumers. As it relates to the medium (enactment failures) of the Directive, I
argue that its passage as a “directive” rather than a “regulation” left the crucial provisions that
were enumerated up to member states to implement but that those provisions were not ones that
should have been left up to member states given the transnational nature of the internet.
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Textual Failures
The U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act was passed in 1998 to map analogue
copyright jurisprudence to the digital age. During the initial drafting of the E-Commerce
Directive by the European Commission, legislators took inspiration from many of the safe
harbors and principles enshrined in this American law (Martinet and Oertli 2015). The DMCA
only applies to ISPs harboring copyright infringements and not other types of objectionable
content whose safe harbors are instead addressed in the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of
1996 (Baistrocchi 2002). The DMCA represents an aggressive, trademark European, regulatory
regime that distinguishes it from the CDA. We would expect that Europe’s adoption of such
DMCA principles in their ECD would yield equally smooth results as has been seen with the
DMCA. However, the ECD only took some, but not all of the DMCA’s provisions. The statutory
language of Articles 12 and 14 protecting ISPs are eerily similar to the DMCA but it chose not to
adopt three crucial consumer protection aspects of the DMCA. Notably, the ECD lacks (1) a
clear monitoring rule, (2) a “put back” procedure, and (3) a punishment for submitting fraudulent
reports (“heckler’s vetoes”). Each of these is at the root of future abuse by malicious, radical
internet users and the future constraints upon law enforcement to stop them. These three would
be passed on repeatedly through future iterations of German ISP legislation and continue to
materialize as real life loopholes to content moderation efforts.
The DMCA makes clear that there is no obligation for sites to monitor, or actively seek
out, copyright infringements.14 But the ECD tried to have its cake and eat it too; sites are both
told that there is no obligation to monitor in Article 15, but that they could also be held to a
“[duty] of care, which can reasonably be expected from them and which are specified by national

14

17 U.S. Code § 512 (m) (1)

39

law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities.”15 There is a vague line that
European ISPs have to tow between whether they are required to constantly monitor for illegal
material under their “duty of care” or are immune under Article 15. This issue came to
prominence in the infamous case Delfi AS v. Estonia (2015). Delfi was a major, informative ISP
in Estonia whose business model thrived off the comments at the bottom of news postings by
pseudonymous users. At the bottom of a 2006 story about ice road commerce and a Estonian
ferry company, users began to post threatening and offensive comments targeting the majority
shareholder of the ferry company, identified as “L” in court documents. The comments alleged
violence and were anti-Semetic. L demanded the comments come down and compensatory
damages of 32,000 euros. Delfi took down the comments but refused to pay the damages. After
a lengthy court battle, the case made it’s way out of the Estonian appeals system, out of the
Estonian Supreme Court, out of the European Court of Human Rights, out of the European
Chamber, and into the 17-member European Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber ruled that
Delfi should have “been able to anticipate the potential liability that arises from operating an
open commenting system” and that if they wanted to solicit comments to their postings that they
needed a faster way of screening and deleting hateful, incendiary comments. The dissenting two
justices note that this causes what they called “collateral censorship” (Kosseff 2019, 150). Sites
are incentivized to lean on the side of caution and proactively remove anything with certain
keywords in the hope of not missing a comment or a posting.
As a result of Delfi’s repeated defeat in the courts and their cost-aversion to hiring a
human team to do this, sites like Delfi have implemented digital screening tools that are either
artificially intelligent or run on keywords. There are numerous examples of Facebook gardening
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groups being shut down for sharing usage with a certain sexually suggestive term16, Indigenous
accounts (ie: Shane Creepingbear) being shut down under suspicion of being a fake bot17, and
legitimate news reporting on certain topics being hidden for using certain keywords in
reporting.18 Amidst all this mainstream content being restricted, radicalizing “fake news” has
co-opted “meme culture” and embraced euphemisms (similar to “Let’s Go Brandon!” in the
U.S.) to subvert such constant monitoring attempts. This is all to say that a textual contradiction
has created the legal uncertainty that forces ISPs to overly police their platforms. Their over
policing has proven ineffective and has, most importantly, led to legitimate news sources being
restricted while fake news constantly adapts and flourish.
In addition to this inversely Darwinistic effect that the constant monitoring provisions
have had on the information reaching consumers, well-intentioned user speech is not given
recourse once being taken down. The DMCA spells out a clear “counter notification” procedure
and timeline in which a user or news outlet can get their content put back up after an automatic
or user-reported complaint.19 The ECD adopted the DMCA regulatory regime that left open the
possibility of “heckler’s vetos” but doesn’t adopt the DMCA provision that could fight them.
Heckler’s vetoes are when people fraudulently report content in the hope that an ISP will err on
the side of instant take down. “However, whereas in the physical world one needs a court order
to stop the distribution of an information product which a court will issue only if it feels the
complaint (is likely to be) justified, in the virtual world it will be enough to merely claim
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material is unlawful to stop it from being disseminated” (Julia-Barcelo and Koelman 2000, 234).
Furthermore, Julia-Barcelo and Koelman (2000) point out that most ISPs have terms and
conditions pages that indemnifies them from legal action against users for the removal of their
content. This lack of a “put back” procedure in the text of the ECD exacerbates the inequalities
created by monitoring provisions.
The final textual issue of the ECD relates to its lack of a punishment for submitting
fraudulent claims (or “heckler’s vetos”). The DMCA explains that any one who “knowingly
materially misrepresents” a claim against an ISP is liable for the damages incurred as a result of
the take down and any attorney’s fees that the ISP has to pay to seek out those damages. 20 In
addition, the DMCA requires that all claims against a piece of content must be made under
penalty of perjury.21 The ECD by comparison lacks both such penalties and any imposition of
such a penalty is left up to member states. However, the liability laws in most member states
operate on a fault-based principle where there is a very high bar to prove that the malicious actor
knowingly misrepresented their claim against an ISP (Baistrocchi 2002). Therefore, those
looking to radicalize (by diluting the pool of legitimate information) can do so with assured
impunity, assuming the ISP or member state can even track them down in the first place.

Enactment Failures
The choice to enact this governance as a “directive” rather than a “regulation” is the
second Achilles' heel of the ECD. Most, if not all, EU legislation seeks to harmonize the laws of
its member countries to streamline its union. Little scholarly research can conclusively explain
why this was passed as a directive, but textual analysis of primary sources reveals that it stems
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from a 1990s/2000s conceptualization of the internet as an intranational rather than transnational
industry. As evidenced by a December 2000 article in The Daily Mail by James Chapman, users
were turned off by the low functionality and high access costs of using the internet. The article
cites experts and internet trade associations who concur that “predictions that the Internet would
revolutionize the way society works has proved wildly inaccurate.”22 At the time this legislation
was being debated and drafted (1998-2000), the interactive web had seemingly lost the luster it
had when first unveiled in the early-90s. In addition to this limited view of the internet being
represented in public sentiment, it was also represented in the legislation that lawmakers at the
time drafted. In the 1997 Tele Services Act, Germany lawmakers expressly exempted all
“teleservices” from having to register or get a license.23 Flash forward ten years and the Tele
Media Act changed that to expressly requiring ISPs register with the government. 24 All of this is
to say that the internet was conceptualized as an industry that had potential to grow but one that
would grow within its own borders, like national broadcasting or data protection.
The Television without Frontiers Directive (1989) harmonized the national laws of the
member nations to allow for more streamlined transmission of “European works” but still
emphasized the importance of national legislation to promote cultural programming and the
growth of each member state’s own broadcasting industry (Kightlinger 2003, 733). The 1995
Data Protection Directive follows a similar analogy. The European Data Protection Supervisor
puts it best in their overview of the history of the GDPR: “Over the last 25 years, technology has
transformed our lives in ways nobody could have imagined so a review of the rules was needed.
In 2016, the EU adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), one of its greatest
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achievements in recent years. It replaces the 1995 Data Protection Directive which was adopted
at a time when the internet was in its infancy.”25 As Hoeren astutely points out in 2000, even if
transnational legislation was desired, it would remain a “mere utopia” (113). As much of a
visionary as he was in that early article forecasting artificial intelligence and a more rapid digital
growth than his contemporaries, he still recognizes the limitations of international cooperation
(or ”wissensordnung” as he defines it) is limited. The internet in the 1990s was still restricted to
national infrastructures of telephone cable to transmit information; more cost-effective and
deterritorializing satellite and wireless connection wouldn’t link the internet infrastructure of
different countries until after the turn of the century. This mainstream conceptualization of the
internet as geographically limited likely inspired the European Commission in 2000, in the same
way it did in 1989 and 1995, to take the least intrusive approach to governing and empower
individual member states to legislate in the name of sovereignty.
This choice to legislate the digital world under minimally intrusive “directives,” however,
comes at a cost. The eventual “deterritorialization” that would happen to the internet, as Hoeren
(2000) remarkably foreshadows, would reveal three things. First, the ways that a “directive”
failed to harmonize national laws. Second, the ways that the internet’s original conceptualization
could have handled minimal transnational communication but is unprepared to keep up with the
scale at which user-generated content would be produced. Finally, the way that such lackluster
harmonization has led to law enforcement’s inability to reduce radicalizing content online. As
proven earlier, the textual safe harbors created vague standards that forced ISPs to err on the side
of systematic content removal, which had a disparate impact reducing user access to legitimate
information more so than reducing user access to radicalizing material. In this section, I’ll
25
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elaborate on the second failure of the ECD: the way that its enactment as a directive further
balkanized the legal landscape for ISPs and restricted transnational and non-EU cooperation on
removing objectionable or radicalizing content.
The EU sought to harmonize jurisdiction over content moderation using a standard called
the “country of origin” principle. The “country of origin” principle is not per se in the directive
itself but is the scholarly way of referring to Recital 22. Recital 22, in summary, articulates that
jurisdiction over an ISP’s content is left up to the member state in which the ISP is domiciled.
Twitter (twitter.com) is legally domiciled at its headquarters in Ireland while a site like
Linksunten (www.linksunten.indymedia.org) is domiciled in Germany; therefore, objectionable
and radicalizing content on Linksuten is held to the national laws of Germany that derive from
the ECD while Twitter to the national laws of Ireland that are also derived from the ECD. The
issue here is that the internet is accessible in all member states, but only one member state can
regulate its material. The ECD states, “Member States may not… restrict the freedom to provide
information society services from another Member State.”26 Therefore, the governance of
objectionable content was left up to each member state whose various incentives to over- or
under-police their domiciled ISPs leads to inconsistencies once the internet became more
transnational and people in Poland could, for example, view content hosted by ISPs domiciled in
Greece.
Pretend a Greek ISP was hosting user-posted content that glorified the Holocaust and
such content was visible to citizens of Poland. If a Polish citizen reported such content, Poland is
helpless to take action against this material. This being the case, the E-Commerce Directive sets
out an override procedure. The reporting state must contact the state in which the ISP is
domiciled and ask for action to be taken. If the glorification of the Holocaust is not a codified
26
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legal offense in Greece, Greece would hardly be able to address their complaint (Kightlinger
2003). If Greece was unable to address the reported content or addressed it “inadequately,” then
Poland could notify the European Commission and the member state that it was invoking the
Article 3 (4) override provision. Only after a review of the alleged violation, could the European
Commission grant or deny the reporting state’s request to take action against an ISP domiciled in
another member state. For a request to be granted, the reporting state must prove the request is
necessary to: “(1) public policy, in particular the prevention, investigation, detection and
prosecution of criminal offences, including the protection of minors and the fight against any
incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality, and violations of human
dignity concerning individual persons, (2) the protection of public health, (3) public security,
including the safeguarding of national security and defence, [or] (4) the protection of consumers,
including investors.”27
Such an override provision would seem to benefit international coordination on content
moderation. However, a lack of underlying harmonization among national laws created high
transaction costs for member states to engage with other member states. As Kightlinger (2003)
notes, “Rather than giving detailed instructions to the Member States on how to harmonize
national laws affecting the Internet, the E-Commerce Directive establishes a "country of origin"
rule… not surprisingly, the Member States were hesitant about adopting a ‘country of origin’
rule covering areas of the law that had not been harmonized” (728, 733). The country of origin
rule and the override procedure would work seamlessly if every member state’s criminal statutes
were the same. But many of the national laws that governed the internet differed from country to
country. Things like the standard of proof for defamation, the age of consent, and the treatment
of inflammatory free expression differed across member states and complicated the process for
27
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removing content whose illegality was not unanimously agreed to across member states. Because
of this lack of harmonization, member states were required to consult the Commission and wait
to receive a ruling before proceeding.
Such rulings, however, come as a last resort and are time consuming. Mark Kightlinger
(2003) continues that his experience with the officials in the European Commission lead him to
believe there “would be an informal effort to persuade” the reporting country not to require the
country of origin to implement a blanket injunction against the content (740). Instead,
Commission officials might encourage the reporting country to just block access to the websites
that their citizens can see rather than forcing the country of origin to revoke access from
everyone in the EU, even those outside the reporting country. The Commission seems to prefer
the least invasive and precedent setting action whenever possible. The lack of underlying
harmonization scared member states when it was proposed and was correctly foreshadowed to
indeed plague member states with high transaction costs associated with international
cooperation.

Transposition of the E-Commerce Directive
As has been shown, the naively limited conceptualization of the internet led to the
creation of a European directive in 2000 that was riddled with textual and implementation-based
potholes that would lay a strong foundation for the haphazard regulation of intermediaries that
member states would later implement for the next two decades. Contrary to a regulation whose
language superimposes the existing statutes of member states, directives need to be implemented
in a timely manner by the proper legislative channels of each member state. The ECD stipulates
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a January 17, 2002 deadline for national legislatures to “transpose” the directive into national
legislation.28
According to Eur-Lex, Germany reported to the European Union on December 20, 2001 a
bill (called the Elektronischer Geschäftsverkehr-Gesetz, Electronic Commerce Act, or EEG) that
supposedly implemented the majority of the E-Commerce Directive. That being said, there is
interestingly no such record of the EEG existing in the German federal registry of legislation.
Academics seem split; a minority of which label the 2001 Electronic Commerce Act as the
official transposition of the ECD and an overwhelming majority of academics labeling instead
the 2007 Tele Media Act as such. The two acts are identical but the text of the EEG that was
submitted to the European Union appears to be instructions for amending the 1997 Tele Services
Act whereas the 2007 Tele Media Act is formatted as a finalized piece of legislation. What this
implies is that Germany submitted their agreed upon intent to amend the 1997 bill as their
amendment to the 1997 bill that would have satisfied their deadline. In reality, the EEG wouldn’t
become law until it was passed six years later as the Tele Media Act of 2007. While the bills are
identical, this is important because it elucidates the lack of oversight that exists between the point
at which a directive is passed by the European Union and the point at which it becomes national
law.
The European Union has struggled with issues of transpositional oversight for years.
Every year, it ranks its member nations on overall performance, transpositional deficit, and
conformity deficit. Transpositional deficit refers to the number of months late a member state
transposes a directive and conformity deficit refers to the percentage of directive language that
the member state incorrectly transposed. The July 2004 and 2007 rankings note two unfortunate
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realities. The 2004 rankings29 judges directives whose deadlines were between March of 2001
and March 2002, like the ECD. It notes that, at the time when it was supposed to transcribe the
ECD, Germany had the second highest number of outstanding directives to transcribe. The 2007
rankings30 evaluation of conformity deficit judges directives, like the ECD, that were transcribed
between March 2006 and March 2007. This report notes that even though Germany made some
of the largest strides to finally clear their outstanding directives that the country still “continue[s]
to accumulate a large number of infringement proceedings” related to inaccurate transposition (p.
7). Germany had the fifth highest number of open infringement proceedings (82) and took the
fifth longest to resolve each one (average of 27 months). All of this is to say that transpositional
delay is an issue in many EU countries, but that Germany was a particularly troubled offender in
the early to mid-2000s. The inaccurate transposition of this E-Commerce Directive and lack of
oversight over such transposition will continue to cause legal uncertainty and therefore hinder
the ability of ISPs to formulate content moderation guidelines.

Tele Media Act of 2007 (“Telemediengesetz”)
The institutional problems facing content moderation in Germany start with the
haphazard textual drafting of the ECD and the improper implementation of this governance as a
directive rather than a regulation. But such problems are compounded by the fact that the
transposition of this directive into the Tele Media Act of 2007 was equally careless. With one
32-word sentence in Section 7 of the Tele Media Act, the Bundestag seemingly negated all the
safe harbors offered to ISPs by the E-Commerce Directive. These safe harbors were the last
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shred of protection ISPs could use to keep content up in the fight against those looking to dilute
legitimate information. In what appears to be an overly expansive reading of the “duty of care”
provision in Recital 48 of the ECD and a willingful ignorance to the actual legislative intent of
the recital, German legislators effectively created a new type of liability that increased the
likelihood of heckler’s vetoes.
As mentioned earlier with the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia (2015), the ECD tried to have
its cake and eat it too. Article 15 prohibits ISPs from being required to constantly monitor, but
Recital 48 says that “duties of care” exist where ISPS can be reasonably expected to “detect and
prevent certain types of illegal activities.”31 Delfi believed it was protected against constantly
monitoring its comment section, but Estonia argued (and the Court ruled) it was reasonable to
expect a company whose business model revolves around sollicing comments to constantly
monitor the comment section. This legal uncertainty has now been codified outside the
legislative intent (recitals) and instead in the textual language of the Tele Media Act. Section 7
(2) of the TMA reads: “Service providers within the meaning of Sections 8 to 10 are not required
to monitor the information transmitted or stored by them or to search for circumstances
indicating an illegal activity. This shall be without prejudice to obligations to remove or disable
access to information under general legislation, even where the service provider does not bear
responsibility pursuant to Sections 8 to 10.” The first sentence is the transposition of Article 15
and the second the apparent codification of Recital 48.
Recitals are written to convey the legislative intent of the operative language in the body
of a bill. They are not legally binding and are, therefore, usually free from political disagreement.
Most importantly, “recitals cannot overrule a relevant operative provision: if they are
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irredeemably inconsistent then the text of the operative provision will take precedence.”32 Recital
48 was written as a way to keep ISPs accountable to the quality of their sites. The “duty of care”
was purposefully vague and put as a recital not to be expansively read and codified as operative
language but rather to be an ace in the sleeve of national governments. That provision exists to
remind ISPs that the safe harbors of Articles 12-14 are not absolute, that they cannot hide behind
them, and that there is still a reasonable expectation that platforms will do their part (even if not
required to) to have some kind of content quality safeguards.
With this in mind, German legislators made legally binding something that was originally
intended to loosely keep ISPs accountable to the unreported content on their sites. But, in doing
so, legislators put the two sentences of Section 7 (2) in seeming contradiction. One exempting
ISPs from monitoring if it’s a host, caching service, or mere conduit and one saying that national
level “obligations to remove or block unlawful content remain unaffected” by a sites status as a
host, caching service, or mere conduit (Hoeren and Yankova 2012, 508). Hoeren and Yankova
label this added sentence a direct contradiction to the protections offered in the E-Commerce
Directive and detail the effects of unchecked transposition as more legal uncertainty. “General,
unambiguous, and binding liability standards, which the Tele Media Act and Directive intended
to create, are absent… In every single case, courts observe the relevant circumstances and facts
before attempting to find a fair balance between the interests of the parties involved” (Hoeren
and Yankova 2012, 528). This contradiction negates any ability for precedent-establishing, legal
clarity upon which ISPs could draft effective and enforceable content moderation guidelines.
Sites are torn between whether they need to actively monitor and err on the side of excessive
“take downs” or whether Article 15 protects them from such an assault on free speech and
32
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expression. In 2017, German legislators seemed to acknowledge this legal uncertainty and
rectified the issue by attempting to embrace the original Article 15 intent of the ECD and
rejecting the burden that Recital 48 put on ISPs.

Network Enforcement Act of 2017 (NetzDG)
In 2016, three of the largest European social media ISPs (Facebook, Google, and Twitter)
met to draft a Code of Conduct which represented one of the most unified opportunities for
industry input into European internet regulation. This meeting and the feedback solicited from
ISPs would later be the inspiration for a 2017 bill called the Network Enforcement Act (Claussen
2018). Although controversial for its constitutionality, the NetzDG passed in late 2017 was put
into effect on January 1, 201833. The act exclusively targets large social media ISPs (two million
or more German users) who were likely paying the largest price as a result of the legal
uncertainties in the TMA. NetzDG clarified not only the content that was being targeted but
established procedures and time frames for moderating such content that were encouraged in the
E-Commerce Directive but completely absent in the Tele Media Act.
For the first time in German intermediary liability legislation, the NetzDG clearly defined
“illegal content” using references to existing analogue criminal and civil codes codes. It created a
time frame under which ISPs must operate depending on the clarity of the content in question. To
avoid liability, clearly illegal content had to be removed in 24 hours and more complex content
that required the advice of a judge would be granted up to 7 days.34 Especially innovative was a
self-regulatory body that was established so that ISPs could turn over questionable content in the
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pursuit of receiving consistent, unbiased, quick legal judgments.35 Finally, there was a much
clearer and more accessible reporting mechanism required on ISPs. Reporting mechanisms for
users were required under the TMA, but sites were incentivized to hide them in obscure sections
of the website. Hiding it meant marginally less notifications from users, less content
systematically taken down, more content on their site and therefore more profits. NetzDG
required that all (1) reporting mechanisms be clearly visible while viewing any type of content
the ISP was supporting and (2) all users of reported content be cataloged and reported to the
government. All of these upgrades represent an important burden shift away from ISPs; this was
a shift away from forcing sites to constantly monitor and a “duty of care.” This legislation gave
users more tools to be their own police for the platforms while also offering ISPs an outside
self-regulatory body to offshore content moderation decisions.
That being said, the self-regulatory body should not be considered a panacea for the
European Union. The self-regulatory body is not there to take all the pressure off ISPs. There is
even an enacted provision that allows the regulatory body to suspect an ISPs privileges of
sending content for consideration if it deems that the ISP could have handled it in-house or is
otherwise misusing the regulatory body.36 While the burden is partially shifted away from ISPs in
this respect, other areas of the 2017 regulation make it so that heckler’s vetoes are still powerful
tools that could be used by people to dilute legitimate information. Specifically, the 24-hour
timeline is what many academics and legislators feared would worsen the systematic content
removal that was incentivized under the ECD and the TMA. In the short term, as Claussen
explains, the 24-hour guideline was effective in taking down content (2018). But the 24-hour
guideline did nothing to long term reduce the creation of this content.
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The 24-hour guideline was like playing “whack-a-mole.” Radicalizing, objectionable
content would pop up and ISPs would (largely indiscriminately) wack it but nothing was being
done to address its underlying cause. Furthermore, academics like Claussen and others even
alleged that such a short timeline for removing content upon notification was a violation of the
ECD. The E-Commerce Directive doesn’t give a time frame in which an intermediary must
remove after notice, it just says it has to happen “expeditiously.”37 Guidelines can be more
restrictive than what the ECD requires since it’s a directive and not a regulation but not if it
substantially changes the incentive structure or regulatory outcomes for ISPs (Claussen 2018).
Article 15, again, prohibits the requirement of ISPs to constantly monitor; this 24-hour guideline
to many scholars effectively enforces a de facto monitoring requirement to try and preempt the
many requests it gets throughout the day. Furthermore, this whack-a-mole on content had long
term implications on journalists seeking to post legitimate news that functions to dilute
objectionable content.
In a 2020 interview38 with the Committee to Protect Journalists, Matthias Kettemann of
the Leibniz Institute for Media Research in Hamburg elaborated on this bill’s deleterious effect
on benevolent users. He noted that reporters whose stories report on hate speech or other crimes
that are listed as keywords for automated moderation algorithms could end up on databases that
further prohibit them from publishing legitimate articles. Further, he explains that COVID-19
played an exacerbating role in this. With a large proportion of human moderators being laid off
or sent home, content moderation was more heavily executed by algorithms and there was
virtually no ability to appeal either fraudulent flags of legitimate stories by the algorithm or
37
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heckler’s vetoes by malicious users looking to dilute legitimate stories. In an August 2020
Facebook (now Meta) statement39, they admit that they’ll be temporarily unable to offer appeals
for the foreseeable future to users who were flagged and that the majority of such flagging is
coming from technological and not human moderation.

Conclusion
This chapter examined the preemptive framework endorsed by the European Union and
all the various ways it errs on the side of removal and affords ISPs limited liability protections
for the speech that they support. I argue that, with the E-Commerce Directive as the foundation,
German regulation has repeatedly created opportunities for objectionable content to dilute the
redemptive power of legitimate speech by leaving open the door for, if not amplifying the effects
of, heckler’s vetoes. Beginning with the E-Commerce Directive, such haphazard regulation
began as a byproduct of (1) textually taking inspiration from the US DMCA without
incorporating all of the underlying principles and (2) its implementation as a directive rather than
a regulation. Both of these missteps can be traced back to the way that the European Union and
its lawmakers conceptualized the internet and its potential, as limited, intranational and best
regulated by constant monitoring provisions on the sites themselves. From this rocky beginning,
this chapter traced the legislative line through 2021’s amendments to the NetzDG and argued that
its status as a directive coupled with Germany’s lackluster history of transcribing directives
accurately and timely created a volatile legal environment at every iteration. Starting with the
Tele Media Act in 2007, the lack of oversight by the European Union on ensuring an accurate
translation led to contradictory statutes regarding the obligation of ISPs to constantly monitor.
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Such a “have your cake and eat it too” incongruity created a perverse incentive for ISPs to err on
the side of removing any reported content. The next update to the Germany intermediary liability
governance, the NetzDG, reified Germany’s ongoingly contradictory understanding of ISP
monitoring provisions. Originating with the Recital 48 v. Article 15 debate in the ECD, the TMA
did through its Section 7(2) contradiction what the NetzDG did through its 24-hour guideline.
Although in different forms, each iteration of German intermediary liability regulation
perpetuated the incentive created in the ECD to err on the side of removal (even if wrongfully
removing legitimate content). Contrary to the problems of the U.S. regulatory regime which
center around the free speech rights afforded to malicious actors, objectionable content is able to
flourish in Europe as a result of malicious actors being able to instead silence legitimate content
providers.
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Chapter 3: United States
What’s more emblematic of the American dream than leaving a job you hated and setting
off on your own to plant your own stake in the world? At 34, Bradley Rukstales of Illinois did
just that. With nothing but a refurbished, early 2000s laptop and a passion, he launched his own
company, Consumer Asset Consulting Group. Outside his successful career in marketing
analytics, Brad’s a self-proclaimed lover of music, smoker of meats, and “dog dad” to his
Maltese Yorkshire Terrier, Daisy. His community knew him well as a patron of “Homes of
Hope” which helps orphanages in India, “Smile Train” which assists children with cleft palate,
the Special Olympics of Illinois, microlending in South Africa, and building homes for the
troops. Suffice to say, Brad and his wife, Jill, along with their two daughters are the epitome of a
stereotypical, wholesome, American, suburban family. Brad’s personal blog 40 remarks about his
family voting their conscience and the importance of unbiased news. A now-CEO at his own
“Big Tech” marketing analytics firm, Brad was no stranger to railing against the manipulation
that sites employ to drum up business. Like many Americans, he deleted traditional social media
applications in a self-announced “social media cleanse” as a result of the reductive and
polarizing information he was being presented. In 2020, however, Brad redownloaded some of
these platforms and was exposed to an internet he previously did not know. Months later, this
meat-smoking, dog dad from Illinois would be caught on CCTV footage in the Capitol Building
throwing metal chairs at police officers and later being detained by no less than three officers in
the Capitol Visitors Center.
Rukstales was no stranger to candidates and arguments affiliated with “The Big Lie” of
the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. FEC filings show that he gave $500 to the National
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Republican Congressional Committee in 2003 but then took a fifteen-year hiatus before giving
his next donation. From 2018 to 2020, Rukstales gave $26,000 to President Trump and
Congressional candidates that affiliated with his ideologies within the Republican Party. But
none of his conduct before this chair-slinging episode is particularly out of the ordinary.
Donating to Trump is not in and of itself any way a red flag for predicting the kind of behavior
Rukstales exhibited on January 6th, 2022. He had no prior criminal record, strong ties to the
community, a clear self-awareness of the dangers of social media, strong financial security, and a
rather politically open family (as evidenced by his eldest daughter who is known to be a very
outspoken Democrat in Chicago-area politics). Even now in court appearances, he goes so far as
to say he has “no excuse for [his] actions,” it was the “single worst personal decision of [his]
life,” and that he “condemn[s] the violence and destruction that took place.”41 So what
happened? How did this ordinary family man with 54-years of unimpeachable character end up
on the ground of the Capitol Visitor Center?

History of Domestic Radicalization
Although Rukstales’ radicalization is not solely attributable to digital factors, the role of
radical, inflammatory content on social media is undeniably a part of this story. It should come as
no surprise that social media sites would be ideal mediums to spread messages. Since its
inception, this has been the case. As mentioned in Chapter 1, groups like the “Aryan Nation
Liberty Net” in the 80s and “Stormfront” in the 90s were predominantly-online, domestic terror
groups (Walther and McCoy 2021) (Conway et al. 2019). In 2009, even the research arm of the
Department of Homeland Security acknowledged the incidence of terror groups on mainstream,
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commercially accessible platforms and wrote an entire report detailing the ways it has reached a
demographic of people not even looking for such content, children (Homeland Security Institute
2009). Its frequency is well established, but its efficacy is the recent revelation.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there has been a dramatic rise (+320%) in the past (5) five
years of right-wing, domestic extremism in the world and Americans are being exposed to that
content almost 30% faster than they were in 2005 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2019)
(Jensen et al. 2018). What January 6th has illuminated is that this social media radicalization is
affecting “unaffiliated citizens” at a much higher rate than ever before. Social media
radicalization has been made more accessible. No longer do you need to be affiliated with an
organized hate group or other collective to be radicalized by this content. In 2021, many of those
who stormed the capitol were influenced to do so by family members, friends, or other role
models and did not travel with an organized group like the Oath Keepers, The Proud Boys, or the
Three Percenters. From 2015-2020, “unaffiliated citizens” accounted for 52% of extremist terror,
but at the January 6th insurrection that number rose to 89%.42 This rise in unaffiliated, domestic
terror comes as research finds that social media is increasingly to blame for each one. A 2018
study by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
explains that from 2005-2016, social media played a role in radicalizing and mobilizing
unaffiliated terrorists in 68.12% of all domestic terror attacks reported to the PIRUS (Profiles of
Individual Radicalization in the United States) database. However, in 2016 alone, that number
rose to 90% (Jensen et al. 2018). Although just a sliver of a much larger body of work, this
research supports the argument that the attack at the Capitol was an aberration from our historical
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conceptualization of online extremism manifesting in reality, that such an aberration is the
growing trend, and that social media plays a growing role in this trend.

Year

2021

Date

Incident

Casualties

Platforms Used

January 6

U.S. Capitol Insurrection
Armed insurrectionists
organized on Gab and Parler
behind the extremist idea that
the 2020 Presidential Election
was being stolen and that votes
were not being counted. On the
day when Congress was going
to certify the votes, 2000-2500
Trump-aligned rioters stormed
the Capitol and called for
violence against Congressmen
and women certifying the
“fraudulent” vote.

Seven (7) dead, 150
officers injured,
countless more
officers reporting
trauma and
PTSD-like
symptoms

Gab, Parler

Ned Pepper’s Bar Shooting
Shooter heavily subscribed to
alt-left, Antifa content on
Twitter and was inspired by
their violent ideologies. He
walked into a bar in Dayton,
OH and opened fire. Complete
motive is unsure, but reports
say it was likely linked to a
history of mental illness and
constructions of reality
presented to him online.

Nine (9) dead,
seventeen (17)
injured

Twitter

El Paso Walmart Shooting
A far-right hate monger,
Crusius, posted on 8chan a
manifesto supporting the
extremist “Great Replacement
Theory” and the 2019
Christchurch mosque
shootings. The shooter was
reading this material
extensively before posting his
own manifesto online detailing
the shooting and his
inspiration. He would then go
into the El Paso Walmart and

Twenty-three (23)
dead, Twenty-three
(23) wounded

8chan

2019

August 3
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open fire allegedly targeting
Latinx customers.

2018

2016

October 27

Tree of Life Synagogue
Shooting
Shooter opened fire on a
synagogue in session in
Eleven (11) dead,
Pittsburg, PA. He was allegedly Seven (7) injured
radicalized by anti-semetic
content posted on Gab and
created content of his own.

Gab

June 12

Orlando Night Club Shooting
Anti-LGBTQ and anti-Latinx
shooting that took place over
three hours inside Pulse, a
historically gay night club in
Orlando. The suspect was
allegedly active in Facebook
groups and read Facebook
content from ISIS that
radicalized him to comit the
second most deadly deadliest
terrorist attack since 9/11.

Fifty (50) dead,
Fifty-eight (58)
injured

December 2

San Bernardino Shooting
Inspired by international jihadi
organizers on various chat
rooms, a husband and wife
opened fire at a holiday party
and training event for
municipal employees before
attempting to plant a bomb and
flee on foot.

Sixteen (16) dead,
Twenty-four (24)
injured

Various chat
rooms

June 17

Charleston Church Shooting
A racially motivated shooting
at a church in Charleston
historically known as a beacon
for civil rights organizing. The
shooter was a known white
supremicist radicalized by
online forums and a manifesto.

Nine (9) dead, One
(1) injured

Various chat
rooms

May 3

Curtis Culwell Center Attack
A foiled attack on a 'Draw
Muhammad' art contest in
Garland, TX. The shooters
were killed before they could
enter the exhibit but were

Two (2) dead, One
(1) injured

Twitter

2015

Facebook
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allegedly radicalized by the
content of Australian jihadist
Joshua Ryne Goldberg online
who posted instructions about
the event and gave a detailed
map of how they should do it.
Figure 3: Selected domestic terrorism attacks perpetrated with the help of radicalizing content online

American Internet Exceptionalism
A critical reader would argue that this is no different than the way the radio or television
could be used to radicalize. After all, Orson Welles’ 1938 radio transmission The War of the
Worlds created mass hysteria and corrupted public information exchanges in an analogous way to
the misinformation currently being spread. But the internet is inherently different. It’s
transnational, translatable, simultaneous, exponentially reproducing, and allows for the
clandestine storage of information within its depths in a way that other mediums like
newspapers, bookstores, radio broadcasts, television shows, or movies cannot. We would expect
a result of this increased functionality would be a proportionately increased regulation, but such
is not the case. As this chapter will explain, the internet is remarkably unregulated. This is a
concept explored in Chapter 1, “internet exceptionalism,” or the idea that the internet has unique
growth potential and therefore should be subject to the lowest level of transaction costs and
regulatory oversight. Legal theory in the U.S. makes clear this distinction between the internet
and other information conduits by contrasting “publisher liability” with “distributor liability”
with full immunity.
“Publisher liability” is the most stringent level of liability to which information conduits
can be held. Traditionally, newspapers, movies, television shows, and radio broadcasts are held
to this standard. It generally holds a medium liable for any illegal, defamatory, or objectionable
content that it publishes to the same level of liability as the person who said it first. This is
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because publishers have the “knowledge, opportunity, and ability to exercise editorial control
over the content of its publications.”43. Take for example the case of Ross v. Santa Barbara
News-Press (2004). This 2004 appeal to the Supreme Court was denied certiorari but concerned
a 1989 case where, essentially, Ross sued the Santa Barbara News-Press newspaper for
misrepresenting the facts of an investigation about allegedly defrauding investors. The paper
published a story about Ross’ business partner who was sentenced to jail time and incorrectly
linked Ross to the events. The newspaper lost the case and was held liable for the damages they
caused to his reputation. The court held the paper has editorial content over the information it
receives on a given story and therefore has an obligation to ensure the veracity (to a certain
extent) of the content to which they give a platform.
“Distributor liability” is a less stringent level of liability to which newsstands, bookstores,
and libraries are held. Such distributors are only held liable if they knew of something illegal in
their offerings but are otherwise under no obligation to search for illegal or objectionable
material otherwise. Take the case of Smith v. California (1959) for example. Put simply, Smith
owned a bookstore that sold a book that contained indecent material and California sought to
punish her for it. She sued and alleged there was no way for her to read every book and prevent
violating the state statute against indecent books. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the
state law but said that she was aware the book was indecent and could be punished for selling the
book again now that she’s been made aware of its illegality. Distributors are only liable if they’ve
received notification and continue to offer access to that material. This is the level of liability to
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which the letter of the law in the European Union and Germany intended to hold sites
accountable.
In contrast to the treatment of American publishers or ISPs in the EU (distributor
liability), the U.S. ISP industry is essentially fully immunized. The previous chapter argued that
the European Union and Germany’s preemptive framework incentivized systematic and proactive
removals of content and that such actions created pathways for objectionable content to flourish
in a way that would run counter to the legislative intent of the E-Commerce Directive. The U.S.,
on the other hand, represents the opposite approach and one that I will refer to as the
deregulatory framework. The U.S. regulatory regime is governed by the Communications
Decency Act (CDA) within the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and, specifically, a section of it
that added a 230th Section to the Communications Act of 1934 (hereinafter “Section 230”). 44
This chapter will explain the important legislative intent behind Section 230, explain the result of
the tension that lies within it, and lay out how that tension has manifested itself in objectionable,
radicalizing content for U.S. viewers. As a result of the way the Telecommunications Act of
1996 was enacted, objectionable content flourishes with neither a legal incentive to remove it nor
an organized body to proactively police it.
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Conceptualization
of the Internet
(Framework)

Deregulatory

Deregulatory

Institution for
Redress

Courts

Outcome
(U.S. Status Quo)
Content is assumed
to remain online
unless challenged in
court and ISPs are
not incentivized to
undertake their own
filtering

Content is assumed
to remain online but
the agency can
Governmental
incentivize ISPs to
Body/Agency
undertake their own
filtering pursuant to
Section 230(c)(2)(A)

Primary
Benefit

Maximizes
total
information
available on the
internet

Primary Drawback

Maximizes amount
of total
objectionable
content

Maximizes
total
Costly and time
information
consuming for the
available on the government
internet

Deregulatory

Internet
Service
Providers

(Not a compatible
combination)

N/A

N/A

Preemptory

Courts

(Not a compatible
combination)

N/A

N/A

Preemptory

Governmental
Body/Agency

Preemptory

Internet
Service
Providers

Minimizes
Agency would have
amount of total
to constantly monitor
objectionable
all content online
content

Costly and time
consuming for the
government

(E.U. Status Quo)
ISP would have to
constantly monitor
all content online

Incentivizes
systematic removals
of content

Minimizes
amount of total
objectionable
content

Figure 4: Chart of potential avenues of internet governance with the corresponding effect such would have on ISP
regulation.

Legislative History of Section 230
Section 230 was originally created to vest content moderation in the hands of parents and
generally to make the internet a safer place for children. With this in mind, it’s ironic that the
legislation would only come to be as a result of Jordan Belfort. You read that correctly; beyond
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the self-described drug use, habitual infidelity, and criminal record, this subject of the 2013 film
The Wolf of Wall Street would indeed have a direct hand in the creation of sweeping internet
decency law originally intended to protect children. Jordan will have to momentarily take a
backseat, however. The important legislative history of Section 230 begins with a 1991 New
York District Court decision, Cubby v. CompuServe.
Don Fitzpatrick ran a daily newsletter, “Rumorville,” that covered gossip about reporters
and the general field of journalism. The newsletter was accessible on CompuServe, a hosting
platform that hosted many different forums and newsletters to which CompuServe members
could subscribe.45 A competing newsletter, “Skuttlebut,” was created by Robert Blanchard and
his company, Cubby. Blanchard and Cubby claimed that Fitzpatrick and “Rumorville” published
allegedly false and defamatory remarks about “Skuttlebut.” Cubby sued Fitzpatrick, which is a
separate case, and also sought to hold CompuServe liable for the speech to which it was giving a
platform. The court dismissed the case in a win for CompuServe by alleging CompuServe was a
distributor rather than a publisher of the information.46 CompuServe exerted no more editorial
control than a public library or bookstore and exercised, nor was expected to exercise, any
editorial control over the content. Five years later, Belfort comes into the picture and he loses
where Cubby won.
Prodigy was a similar site to CompuServe hosting newsletters and forums on different
topics and for different affinity groups. In October 1994, someone posted on “Money Talks,” a
financial gossip newsletter hosted by Prodigy, that Stratton Oakmont and its president had
committed financial crimes in connection with a recent business deal. In the same Southern
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District Court of New York, Stratton Oakmont, Belfort’s trading firm, sought to hold Prodigy
liable for the content of the anonymous user because they alleged it was defamatory and hurting
their ability to do business. Stratton Oakmont noted that Prodigy was a very content-conscious
forum that boasted its cleanliness and family-friendliness. Therefore he argued that they exercise
editorial control that makes them not simply a “distributor” like Cubby but a “publisher” with a
higher standard for content that they host. The judge agreed that Prodigy not only boasted its
content moderators and the guidelines they enforced but went so far as to include it in
promotional materials like in newspaper advertisements that they took out.47 Because of this, the
judge ruled in favor of Stratton Oakmont and held Prodigy liable for the speech of its anonymous
user.
Lawmakers in Congress were outraged by such a result.48 Prodigy was punished for
exerting ethical content moderation while Cubby was rewarded for doing nothing. In an unlikely
bipartisan effort, Representative Chris Cox (R-CA) and then-Representative (now-Senator) Ron
Wyden (D-OR) got together over ice cream to draft legislation that they would add to the
Senate’s recently passed companion bill overhauling the internet (S652 - Telecommunications
Act of 1996).49 The legislative intent of the Cox-Wyden text was clear: the internet had the
potential to blossom as an economic powerhouse, it should be allowed to grow unencumbered by
Federal regulation, and that content is best left up to parents and not the government to police.
Not only would they belabor this point in their floor speeches, but they went so far as to include
such in the text of their bill. Section 230(b)(2) notes that, “[i]t is the policy of the United States
to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
47
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interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” Of particular interest is
Rep. Wyden’s remarks on the floor of the House:
“Now what the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] and I have proposed does
stand in sharp contrast to the work of the other body. They seek there to try to put
in place the Government rather than the private sector… In my view that
approach, the approach of the other body, will essentially involve the Federal
Government spending vast sums of money trying to define elusive terms that are
going to lead to a flood of legal challenges.” 50
In his use of “work of the other body,” Rep. Wyden is referring to the Exon amendment.
The Exon amendment was a piece of legislation that was attached to the
recently-passed and aforementioned Senate companion bill. Senator James Exon (D-NE)
was a grandfather concerned about his grandchildren stumbling across internet
pornography online. As Kosseff notes, Exon carried around what was referred to as “The
Blue Book” which contained pornographic images he alleged were freely accessible on
mainstream sites of the then-nascent internet (62, 2019). While maybe his showing it to
congressional colleagues in the Senate cloakroom to prove his point was a shade
unnecessary, his point was certainly valid. Online pornography was legal for adults to
view (see Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964) and Miller v. California (1973)), there was a growing
amount of pornography online that was unsolicited and accessible to children. His
original amendment would vest the power to the FCC in the same way the agency already
had authority over content broadcast on television and radio. This was done pursuant to
their existing authority to fine companies, stations, and actors for violating decency
guidelines or doing indecent things outside of established “safe harbor hours'' (10 P.M. to
6 A.M.).
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There was opposition to vesting content moderation authority in the FCC,
however. This came particularly from Senator Leahy (D-VT). First, he questioned the
constitutionality of such an undertaking citing the Supreme Court case Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC (1989) which had recently said that sexual
expression is protected under the First Amendment and that restrictions passed in the
name of protecting children cannot impede on the access of consenting adults. But more
importantly and in siding with Cox and Wyden’s eventual rationale, he felt that such
FCC was restricted in its role as an independent agency and that it would only harm the
future growth of the internet. He cited the fact that their attempt at regulating
“dial-a-porn,” pornographic content transmitted via traditional cable telephone, took
almost 10 years of litigation to do constitutionally. Instead, he proposed handing off
authority to the Department of Justice so that speech would be less infringed upon and so
that actions would only be undertaken in the event of rooting out criminal activity.51
However, neither the DOJ nor the FCC wanted jurisdiction at the time. In addition to
recognizing the chilling effects that their regulation would have on the industry’s growth,
they both note the subjectivity of moderating internet speech and how this is a job left to
the legislature.5253
Suffice it to say that the legislative history of Section 230 is riddled with a
complicated debate about regulatory authority that would coalesce with the Cox-Wyden
text eventually prevailing. The Cox-Wyden statute firmly applied the U.S. “court order
standard,” where everything is presumed to stay accessible online until a court says
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53
Benjamin Wittes, Interview: Reed Hundt Picks His Battles, Legal Times, Sept. 4, 1995, at 10, 12.
52

69

otherwise, to the internet.54 This is in contrast to the preemptive framework which was
chosen by the European Union and which would arguably have been implemented in the
U.S. if the FCC was vested with initial authority.55 Once the bill eventually got to the
President, there was little media coverage or dispute about the Cox-Wyden addition.
Telephone and cable companies were too concerned with other areas of the bill that more
clearly affected them (Kosseff 2019). This niche debate over vesting authority over the
then-nascent internet industry was of little concern to them at the time (which they would
very quickly live to regret). Once signed by President Clinton on February 8, 1996,
Section 230 would only be modified two times. First in 1998 to address a technical
clarification about how the section interacted with a recently passed act about child safety
online. The second time is in 2018 with SESTA/FOSTA, which was an act that amended
Section 230 to no longer immunize ISPs that were facilitating sex trafficking.
SESTA/FOSTA is a fascinating case study for another thesis argument and more so
reflects the institutional failures of political participation in law drafting rather than
lending credence to my argument about the contrasting frameworks. For this reason, it
should be mentioned as evidence of the fact that Section 230 has otherwise gone
untouched for 25-years but will not be explored in greater detail for the sake of clarity in
my argument.
The problem that my argument seeks to address is how this U.S. framework has
itself bolstered objectionable content. With the background of U.S. digitally-inspired
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terrorism and the legislative history of its supposed solution in mind, I’ll now break down
what Section 230 specifically spells out (and doesn’t spell out) from both a textual and
administrative perspective. First, I’ll argue below that the text of Section 230 allows sites
to create content moderation safeguards but doesn’t incentivize them to do so. Sites are
under a perverse incentive to host objectionable speech in so far as they appear just
marginally less objectionable than their competitors. Second, I’ll argue that there exists a
contradicting textual basis of FCC jurisdiction. The legislative history of the act makes it
clear that Congress didn’t want the FCC to have jurisdiction over the internet, and yet left
open certain legal doors that allow the FCC to be granted a circular pathway to authority
over the internet.

Text of Section 230
Section 230 is broken up into four major sections. The first of which (subsection (a)) is
the “findings” of Congress that lay out the facts that they felt distinguished the internet from
other mediums that are regulated. The second (subsection (b)) is the “policy” of Congress which
spells out the legislative intent of where Congress wanted to place the onus of enforcing this text.
The third (subsection (c)) gives the clear and concise immunity blanket for both content left up
and good faith moderation efforts to take content down. This section directed future courts in
interpreting the “court order standard” that was created by this immunity. The final section
(subsection (e)) is exemptions to the blanked immunity offered to ISPs. Originally four
exemptions, but after SESTA/FOSTA that became five exemptions to the protections of Section
230.
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Section 230(a) offers a window into how Congress valued and conceptualized the internet
in 1996. This section could be understood as evidence that Congress intended to distinguish the
internet from other mediums and the liabilities they’re held to (distributor or publisher liability).
Of the five “findings,” two are of particular relevance. Section 230(a)(2) notes that, “These
services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as
the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops.”56 No other medium
under the U.S. regulatory regime offers users or sites the ability to repackage the information.
Newspapers are static and the words are the same for everyone, radio broadcasts are not
personally recorded for each listener, and books are not reprinted depending on the font
preferences of the reader. But the internet is interactive, which is what the statute codifies as a
distinction here. Finally, Section 230(a)(4) confirms again the legislative intent of both the House
(Cox and Wyden) and the Senate (Leahy) by writing, “The Internet and other interactive
computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation.”57 It’s clear that the Wyden-Cox-Leahy perspective on internet
exceptionalism prevailed over the Exon perspective that the internet should be held to the same
regulatory level as other mediums. Was that the right choice? Such will be explored later in this
chapter, but Section 230(a) is important evidence that Congress made up its mind (in theory).
Section 230(b) from the perspective of “the forest” appears to represent evidence of
Wyden-Cox-Leahy’s perspective again, but at the level of “the trees” leaves open legal loopholes
for supporters of Exon’s perspective for agency regulation. Section 230(b)(2) is one of the most
widely quoted sections of the text. It explains that “it is the policy of the United States to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
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interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”58 With that being said,
the rest of the subsection implies a need for a Federal regulator. Section 230(b)(1, 3-5) write:
“It is the policy of the United States –
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media; […]
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control
over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use
the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and
filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to
objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”59
Such language further muddies the water between Exon’s perspective and that codified
elsewhere in the statute. As the FCC will later argue, “promoting,” “encouraging,” “removing
disincentives,” “and ensuring vigorous enforcement” all require an overseer. In the eyes of the
FCC, Congress’ intention to prevent the fettering of the internet needs to be carried out and
prevented by a Federal overseer. This will be later explored in this chapter, but represent a crucial
contradiction between deregulation and enforcing that deregulation.
Section 230(c) is the famous twenty-six words that Kosseff alleges created the internet.
This is a line that the in-house attorneys at Facebook and civil rights groups alike know by heart.
Section 230(c)(1) gives immunity to sites for things they choose to leave up by proclaiming, “No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider.”60 In response to pages upon
pages of briefs and amicus filings, these twenty-six words are all a site needs to submit at times
to get a case against them dismissed. Section 230(c)(2)(A) was written as a direct response to the
holding in Prodigy. It immunizes ISPs for good faith efforts to restrict access to objectionable
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material. Sites do not open themselves up to civil liability from users whose content was
removed as long as it is done in a good faith effort to preserve the internet ecosystem. For
example, anti-competitive motives, like Twitter removing Zuckerberg’s posts on Twitter, are not
protected. Finally, Section 230(c)(2)(B) enables sites to offer users the opportunity to self-select
what they individually would like to see. This clause provides liability protection to Facebook
for offering a “hide” button or TikTok for offering a “don’t show me more like this” feature.
Section 230(c) has both a sword and a shield; subsection (c)(1) is a shield from liability for what
they choose to keep up and subsection (c)(2) is a sword that allows sites to remove objectionable
content.
Finally, Section 230(e) offers exemptions to these liability protections. Section 230(c)
protection does not apply to: Federal criminal law, IP infringements, state laws consistent with
Section 230, sites that host certain illegally obtained information61, and any sites that knowingly
engage in sex trafficking or intend to promote it. A critical reader of my argument would see
Section 230(e)(1) about Federal criminal law and argue that sites hosting inciting speech do not
fall within the protections. That would make sense; inciting violence against the U.S.
government is a Federal crime that this subsection says is exempt from immunity protections.
Therefore we would expect sites to more actively monitor for this speech because they’re not
immune.
To which, there are two responses. First, rarely are users on Facebook explicitly saying,
“I would like you all to storm the Capitol and hurt someone on this day at this time.” Generally,
the speech on these sites is inflammatory but fails to reach a bar where it constitutes a call to
explicit action. As it relates to the application of this specific crime to the specific incidence of
January 6th, it seems more likely than not that the speech being put out on Facebook or Gab or
61
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Parler was general calls to actions and restatements of misinformation where people drew their
own conclusions to storm the Capitol together. Once people have been amassed, their planning of
the “imminent lawless action”62 takes place on encrypted sites like Telegram or Whatsapp, some
type of alt-tech site, or on the dark web. Even if a user explicitly posts on Facebook that they
intend to do something criminal and incites others to join him or her in that specific crime,
Facebook needs to be notified that something said on their site broke a Federal statute and have
time to respond before being held liable. There are too many federal criminal statutes in
existence that a requirement to monitor for all of them would result in the ‘constant monitoring’
dilemma that has played out in Europe for the past twenty-five years. All of that being said, some
good comes of this criminal law exemption. But that good is not a panacea for objectionable
content, especially those that fail to hit high bars of federal proof or hit those high bars of proof
on sites that are harder to police (dark web, alt-tech sites).

Site

Founding

Alternative to...

Status

4chan

2003

Instagram

Active

Epik

2009

Amazon Web Services

Active

MeWe

2012

Facebook

Active

8chan

2013

Instagram

Active

Rumble

2013

YouTube

Active

Telegram

2013

AIM Instant Messenger

Active

Signal

2014

AIM Instant Messenger

Active

Minds

2015

Facebook

Active

Odysee (LBRY)

2015

YouTube

Active

Triller

2015

YouTube

Active

WeSearchr

2015

Crowdfunding

Active
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DTube

2016

YouTube

Active

Gab

2016

Facebook/Twitter

Active

WASP Love

2016

Dating Site

Active

BitChute

2017

YouTube

Active

DLive

2017

YouTube

Active

GoyFundMe

2017

Crowdfunding

Defunct

Hatreon

2017

Crowdfunding

Defunct

PewTube

2017

YouTube

Defunct

Slug

2017

Facebook

Active

SubscribeStar

2017

Crowdfunding

Active

WrongThink

2017

Facebook

Active

Parler

2018

Facebook/Twitter

Active

Thinkspot

2019

Crowdfunding

Active

Gettr

2021

YouTube

Active

Figure 5: Non-exhaustive, sample list of alt-tech ISPs that accomplish traditionally-mainstream functions but boast
stronger encryption or less access to the general population.

Judicial Manifestations of Section 230
As mentioned, this text creates a deregulatory framework and a “court order standard”
where there is not only an incentive to keep the internet free from government intervention but
also that any attempts for government intervention are decided by the courts. Section 230 gets an
infamous reputation among myopic onlookers as a statute that allegedly condones terrible things
being on the internet. There are many ways that the U.S. could have created their regulatory
regime, but they chose to do so by pairing a deregulatory framework with a court order standard.
While this combination does maximize the total amount of information available to consumers of
the internet, it also allows for the largest amount of objectionable material to remain online. The
cases below will illustrate that such a combination has manifested in objectionable material
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remaining online. With neither a governmental body nor agency to police content not brought
before a court nor an incentive for sites to maximize their content moderation efforts, a body of
case law is created that highlights the objectionable content being created through this platform
complacency.
The first major Section 230 case, Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (1997), arrived at the
courts less than a year after its passage. Kenneth Zeran was an ordinary citizen living an ordinary
life. The only thing that made him unique was that his phone rang non-stop starting in April
1995. Shortly after the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, an
anonymous user of AOL posted an advertisement selling shirts that glorified the bomber and his
motives. The anonymous user listed Ken by name and listed his phone number at the bottom of
the listing. Zeran reached out to AOL in the hopes that they would remove the fraudulent posting
and an employee said that the platform would do so. However, the posting would since be
reposted multiple times by other anonymous users of AOL despite the original one being
removed. Zeran alleges AOL lost its protections as a distributor once it took down the
advertisement but failed to screen for future iterations of the content. Ken and his lawyer, Leo
Kayser, acknowledged that they couldn’t hold AOL liable as a publisher because of Section 230,
but they alleged that the site was given notice of the illegal, defamatory material and should
therefore be liable for giving a platform to such content’s reproduction.
The famous ruling by Judge Wilkinson sided with AOL in holding that a distributor is the
same as the word publisher and that Section 230’s use of publisher included those that didn’t
even curate the content to which they gave a platform. Wilkinson wrote that “subjecting a
computer service provider to liability based on the provider’s knowledge would ‘reinforce
service providers’ incentives to restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation.’” 63 This Zeran
63
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ruling was a major case for proving Section 230’s purpose because it (1) distinguished the US
regulatory regime from the European model and its downsides and (2) it conferred immunity to
both sites that moderate content (like Section 230(c)(2) (A) intended) and those that do not (like
Section 230(c)(1) intended). Kenneth would continue to receive death threats, his phone would
continue ringing as this content was republished, and the anonymous posting prevented him from
receiving any recourse. Furthermore, cases like Ken’s would be just the beginning of a case law
riddled with victimized people not receiving recourse.

Case

Blumenthal v. Drudge

Doe v. America Online

Batzel v. Smith

Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc.

Year

What went unpunished as a result of a Section 230
defense?

1998

The Drudge Report posted an article alleging that Sydney
Blumenthal, a White House staffer, assaulted his wife, also
a White House staffer. Both husband and wife denied the
assault happened and sued for defamation. The Drudge
Report pays AOL to amplify its content. This article was
amplified through Capitol Hill circles but the Court ruled
that, while the Drudge Report could be held liable, AOL
was immune from liability for reproducing and
amplifying the content.

2001

An 11-year old boy was lured into sexual acts with an adult
defendant via AOL chat rooms. The defendant recorded the
encounter and marketed this video online. While the
defendant could be tried for these crimes, Justice Wells
ruled that AOL was immune from liability and had no
legal obligation to prevent the future reproduction of
this content by other users on the site.

2003

Smith accused Batzel, a California attorney, of owning art
stolen by the Nazis and being a descendant of Heinrich
Himmler. Batzel’s career was upended and still lost her
case.

2003

Famous Star Trek actress, Christianne Carafano, was being
stalked by a man in Berlin. He eventually created a fake
dating profile with her name and image and posted her
personal phone number and address (which violated the
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dating site’s terms of service). Other stalkers would leave
sexually explicit voicemails and threats against her and her
son. She and Jeremiah had to flee their house and live
hotel-to-hotel for months until the dating site eventually
took down her post. She alleged the dating site should have
had content filters to spot this infraction and rectify the
situation faster upon receiving notice. The Court disagreed
and said matchmaker.com had no obligation to seek or
disable such content.

Doe v. MySpace

Barnes v. Yahoo!

Jones v. Dirty World
Entertainment
Recordings LLC

Klayman v. Zuckerberg

Doe v. Internet Brands

2008

A 13-year old girl was lured into meeting a 19-year old boy
she met on MySpace and was sexually assaulted. The
Court ruled that MySpace was not liable for hosting
such content or for being an accomplice to the actions of
the sexual preditor.

2009

Barnes’ ex-boyfriend posted revenge pornography of her
online following their breakup and pretended to be her on
multiple chat rooms to entice men into sexual relationships
with Barnes. These postings listed her address and phone
number. These men would repeatedly call and arrive at her
home and office under the promise of solicited sex. This
case had to deal with a legal principle known as promissory
estoppel as the central issue. But the Court ruled that
Yahoo! was immunized under Section 230 from having
to take down these posts even if they promised they
would.

2014

Posts were made online (and endorsed by the site’s
moderator) about high school teacher and Bengals
cheerleader, Sarah Jones, alleging she was sexually
promiscuous, STI-positive, and having inappropriate
relationships with her students. The Court ruled that the
site and its moderator were both immune under Section
230 and Jones had to pay Dirty World Entertainment
$6,000+.

2014

Klayman sued Facebook after they dragged their feet in
removing the “Third Palestinian Intifada” Facebook page
which called for Muslims around the world to rise up and
kill Jewish people. Facebook and Zuckerberg easily
dismiss the case under Section 230.

2014

Doe was using a website that connects aspiring models to
shoots looking for models. The site had both an anecdotal
and analytical history of being used to lure women into
nonconsensual sexual encounters. Doe was lured into a fake
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audition, drugged, raped, and recorded. The Court ruled
that the site was immune from punishment despite this
history of abuse on their site.

Doe v. Backpage

Fields v. Twitter

Herrick v. Grindr

Force v. Facebook

2016

A group of parents filed suit in Massachusetts alleging that
the sex trafficking of their children was a result of
Backpage.com. They argue the business model of Backpage
incentivized such illegal actions and facilitated
advertisements for their children. The Court denied the
parents standing to sue and denied that the site’s
behavior constituted facilitation of such trafficking. This
case would later be the impetus for the SESTA/FOSTA
Amendment to Section 230 and the 2017 film I Am Jane
Doe which details the trial and the lives of the trafficked
girls.

2016

Two American service members, Lloyd “Carl” Fields, Jr.
and James Damon Creach, were killed overseas in Jordan
by Anwar Abu Zaid. It was discovered he was a member of
an ISIS radicalization ring on Twitter and ISIS claimed
responsibility. The Court ruled that Twitter was neither
negligent nor liable for the deaths of Fields and Creach.

2019

Herrick’s ex-boyfriend began impersonating Herrick on
Grindr, a dating app, and instructing suitors that he
(“Herrick”) had a hardcore rape fantasy and preferred role
play. Some men would come to Herrick’s office and
physically assault him and threaten him and his co-workers.
The Court ruled that Grindr was not liable for hosting
the fraudulent profiles despite notification of illegal
activity.

2019

Families of five Americans who were killed or hurt in Israel
by attacks perpetrated by Hamas, a defined terror
organization. Plaintiffs allege that Facebook knowingly
hosted Hamas profiles and their algorithm funneled
radicalizing content and terror plots to like-minded, but
unaffiliated anti-Israel terrorists. The Court ruled that
Facebook’s algorithm did not constitute a form of
editorial discretion over the content and that Section 230
could immunize Facebook.

Figure 6: A selection of a few, high-profile cases that sided with ISPs and ruled in favor of their Section 230(c)(1)
immunity to allow such content to remain online. These are strictly summaries and do not include the many levels of
nuance that these cases present. The objectionable content is highlighted and the result is bolded. (Source: Kosseff
(2019) and Brannon and Holmes (2021))
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Limitations of the “court order standard” employed by Section 230
The central argument of this chapter is not proven by the cases themselves, such is out of
the scope of my question. Let’s assume that all the cases above are justly decided given the facts
of each case. From an institutional perspective, vesting the courts (rather than with the ISPs or
with a government agency) with the power to provide recourse for victims came with drawbacks.
First, judicial remedy requires that the injustice occurs before the issue at stake can be clarified.
Second, these clarified issues are often decided on narrow grounds that depend on the facts of the
case. This makes it difficult to use these cases as the building blocks of a clearer legal landscape
for the internet ecosystem. While an agency rule or clarification can have wide applicability, the
court ruling in Zeran or Force or Barnes, for example, only serves to prevent future infractions
of the same circumstances and in the same jurisdictions. After all, Ninth Circuit rulings are not
binding in Virginia in the same way that Second Circuit rulings are not binding to cases that arise
in Silicon Valley. Such “circuit split” became evident recently when the Third Circuit ruled in
2021 that celebrities could sue Facebook for unauthorized use of their images in state court under
Section 230(e)(2)64 but such was a direct contradiction to the holding in another famous Section
230 case in 2007 in the Ninth Circuit.65 All of this is to say that there exist issues with vesting
recourse in the courts.
This is not to say that a judicially regulatory pathway is bad in and of itself. After all, the
newspaper industry has used it for years. As will be later explained, the content of newspapers is
not under the jurisdiction of the FCC or another government agency. Therefore victims of what
they publish do not receive recourse through future rulemaking clarifications but only through
the courts evaluating their claims. The difference between the judicial oversight of newspapers
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and of the internet is where the regulation places the onus. Section 230 specifically precludes
ISPs from publisher liability. The burden of proof under “publisher liability” is the responsibility
of newspapers in a way that the internet is not burdened as such. If allegations are made against a
newspaper in court, the defendants (the newspaper) have to prove that they are entitled to
immunity. If allegations are made against an ISP in court, the plaintiffs (victim of the speech)
have to prove that the ISP is not entitled to protection. Immunity is the internet’s to lose where
it’s the newspaper industries’ to gain. For the internet, Section 230 takes away one of the crucial
checks and balances, the onerous burden of proof, that allow such industries not under the
regulatory jurisdiction of a government agency to responsibly be a part of a judicial regulatory
scheme.
The question then becomes, why isn’t the internet under the jurisdiction of the FCC? The
FCC already regulates radio, television and phone content through things like safe harbor hours,
explicative guidance, and guidelines on nudity and enforces such with fines, sanctions, censures,
and licensing penalties. So why is the internet exceptional? The answer is… (very) complicated.
But it essentially boils down to the way that early Congressional instruction and FCC
interpretation hamstrung the future regulation of the internet. It should be noted that, while the
FCC is an independent agency, its chairpeople who vote are politically appointed. This is evident
in the countless 3-2 votes undertaken by the panel of five in charge of overseeing the FCC that
almost always falls upon partisan lines. While the FCC is politically volatile, it’s a nimble,
proactive, and dynamic regulatory complement to the courts.
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FCC Authority over the Regulation of the Internet
In contrast to the courts and Congress, the FCC has more access to industry knowledge.
As the literature has illuminated, there exists a pervasive exchange between the FCC and
industry leaders that some have dubbed a “revolving door” (Gilens and Page 2014; Popiel 2018).
Their regulators go on to work at broadband, cellular, telecommunications, and radio companies
and vice versa. As a result of the regularity of this knowledge and the proactive nature of
agencies in comparison to courts, the FCC can more agilely make rulings that adapt to new
technologies. We’ve seen examples of their hands-on regulatory abilities in the past: the
modification of explicative standards, changing definitions of sexual innuendo, and inclusion or
exclusion of other types of speech as they become more or less societally acceptable (Levi 2008).
The FCC has power over most things related to communication, telecommunications, and
broadcasting with hands in both the economics and production of all this material. From a speech
perspective, the FCC has control over what can be said, when it can be said, who can say it, and
the punishments for violating such rules. But the FCC chairs are politically appointed and the
FCC is therefore subject to changing politics as administrations change.
As a result of this, the FCC’s policymaking can best be described as they’re writing a
chain novel. The chairs have five-year terms and each successive administration of chairs gets to
write a new chapter over the next four years but it has to be in line with the chapters made by the
administrations before. They can chalk a few chapters up to being a “dream sequence” or a
flashback but they can’t ignore the precedents and backstories of characters in the novel. As a
result, the FCC’s regulatory scheme can best be described as a patchwork. As Thompson (2010)
notes using a gardening analogy, they can plant new policies but some of those policies can’t
touch other policies in the garden and some need more or less sunlight than others. So trying to
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adapt this garden to a whole new plant, or a whole new industry like the internet, can create
issues of jurisdiction that are hindered by previous plantings. In addition to the issues that the
FCC has with incorporating this new plant into their metaphorical garden, there are also issues of
whether they’re allowed to be the gardener in the first place.
As I will argue in the subsequent sections, the FCC has questionable authority over the
regulation of the internet and as such has refrained from issuing heavy-handed regulation over
speech on the internet to avoid their jurisdiction of the internet as a whole from being challenged
in court. The argument begins with Congress’ simultaneous definition of the FCC as both the
administrator and not the administrator over the internet in their 1996 bill. From there, the FCC
started a chain novel by pulling at textual straws in the bill to establish jurisdiction over the
internet through a constantly modifying precedent. This further complicated the existing
patchwork of a regulatory regime. By the 2010s, the FCC took a big step in the direction of
genuine internet jurisdiction. But in doing so, it linked speech on the internet to “net neutrality,”
which would further complicate regulation as those two issues became part of politically
opposing agendas by the early 2020s. With all of this in mind, my argument closes by addressing
the way that legislative corrections to this patchwork regulatory regime are nearly impossible as
a result of the uncontrollable rise of these ISPs and the radically different political environment
that had developed by the time the U.S. could realize they had a problem.

Was the FCC vested with regulatory jurisdiction over the internet?
The FCC would like the answer to be “yes” but Congress constructed the 1996 bill in a
way that left such ambiguous. Congress made very explicit within Section 230 that the FCC was
to have no hand in regulating the internet, but legally Section 230 is placed within a larger bill
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that amends Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 which is explicitly under the FCC’s
jurisdiction. Questions arise of policy statements and legislative intent and how the two reconcile
when in conflict. This section will first recap the way Congress and the FCC fought over the
jurisdiction of the internet. Second, it will explain how the FCC fought with its past self to
establish jurisdiction over the internet.
The framers of Section 230 unambiguously proclaimed that “it is the policy of the United
States to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”66 This in
addition to the failure of the Exon Amendment and the statements on the floor of the House
mentioned above all support the textual proof that Congress intended Section 230 and ISPs be
unencumbered by federal regulation, including the FCC. Congress felt that the internet was
different from other services (TV, radio, telephone, etc.) under the FCC’s umbrella because the
“basic justifications for regulating traditional communications (scarcity and monopolization)
[did] not apply” (Kennedy and Zallaps 1999, 18). There are endless computers, packets, and
passageways to and within the internet that were exponentially growing without the need for
physical infrastructure, unlike traditional FCC services that needed telephone wires or radio and
television stations.
Despite this exceptionalism coded within Section 230, there exists a strong opposition
that similarly cites legislative intent and textual grounding to find FCC jurisdiction. Prior to a
committee conference that struck it, there existed a Section 104(d) in the 1996 bill which went
even further than the “unfettered” clause within Section 230(b)(2); it specifically enumerated that
the FCC was precluded from overseeing the regulation of the internet (Crawford 1997). Section
230(b)(2) is strictly a statement of legislative intent, not of policy direction. Proponents of FCC
66
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jurisdiction further cite the dissonance within Section 230(b), the same section that contains the
“unfettered” clause. As mentioned above, Section 230(b)(1, 3-5) represents a hidden escape
valve of sorts that was added to the bill by someone from Exon’s side of the issue. They imply
that an actor will “promote… development,” “encourage… development,” “remove
disincentives” to the development of the internet in addition to “[ensuring] vigorous enforcement
of Federal criminal laws” but do not name who the actor is (or is not).67 Such has been construed
to imply that the FCC, whose Communications Act is being amended by the 1996 bill, is the
unspoken actor. This dissonance and the contrasting signals of legislative intent would riddle the
next two decades of attempts made by the FCC to establish authority. To understand better the
regulatory patchwork they would create thanks to this ambiguity, we need to understand the tools
that the FCC could use to create it.

Pathways of Acquiring Jurisdiction
The FCC has two major legal pathways to authority over an industry: statutory authority
and ancillary authority. The FCC has statutory authority over “common carriers.” Common
carriers are services under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. They are defined as a
service engaged “in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or interstate or foreign
radio transmission of energy.”68 This refers to telephones, radio transmissions, and the original
medium of cable television over wires. Under this authority, the FCC has complete jurisdiction
over these mediums. It can regulate the communication that goes over the wires, the installation
of the wires, the merging of these wired companies, and anything else that is done pursuant to
defending the principles of common carrier communications like competition, fairness, and
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access. An important distinction is that while all common carriers are wired, not all wired
communications are common carriers.
Although the early days of the internet used dial-up and other telephone-adjacent
technologies, the internet was not cleanly classified as a common carrier. Although the
“interactive computer services” (ISPs) are listed in a provision (Section 230) within Title II, they
are defined as a type of “information service” under Title I whose two-way, interactive nature
distinguishes it from the characteristics of common carriers. Title I services are “unregulated
services” of the FCC not under the statutory authority. But, because Title I services are still under
the larger Communications Act of 1934, they can be regulated but only if such is tangentially
related to one of its Title II authorities. This is called a Chevron defense. In 1984, environmental
groups challenged the EPA’s ability to quantify provisions of the Clean Air Act that were left
unquantified by Congress’ original text. A unanimous Supreme Court found 69 that Congress did
not enumerate a specific intention for the interpretation of the term and that the EPA was in the
best position to create a reasonable policy choice. Therefore, the EPA was permitted to issue
clarifying policy. This legal leeway was clarified again in 2001 when the Supreme Court ruled
that any agency interpretations of statutes “qualify for Chevron deference when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”70
Only once (2015-2017) did the FCC have statutory authority over “interactive computer
services” and it only came as a result of decades of litigation and the precedent established in a
major 2005 Supreme Court case. Otherwise, the FCC has had a mix of ancillary authority or no
authority for the remainder of its interactions with ISPs. Even that statutory authority in 2015
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would eventually be overturned in 2017 when former President Trump would take office. The
complicated story of patchwork regulatory attempts to secure ancillary jurisdiction over the
internet begins in the 1960s when the internet was at its absolute infancy. From here, I’ll be
illustrating the haphazard way the FCC has written its chain novel over the years as a way of
demonstrating how the court order standard in the U.S. failed to prevent the rise of objectionable
material. Section 230(c)(1) protects content left up and Section 230(c)(2) immunizes ISPs for
good faith efforts to enact self-moderation. The court order standard privileges ISPs who can
hide behind Section 230 for the content left up and the only check that could have existed on the
system is if the FCC had less volatile jurisdiction over these ISPs and could have incentivized
them to undertake more good faith efforts to self-moderate.

Volatile History of FCC Jurisdiction over ISPs
In 1966, the FCC initiated Computer Inquiry I, a policy that sought to differentiate
computer communication from data processing. To the commission, communication was defined
as a “basic” service of computers, while data processing was defined as “enhanced.”71 Computer
communication at the time (called “message switching”) was a very rudimentary form of sending
code between terminals with little to no reformatting. The commission created rules that
prevented competition over these wires between terminals but it deregulated, encouraged growth,
and promoted competition when it came to creating additional safeguards for data processing.
The FCC wanted technologies with the power to not just transmit code but reformat it and be
interactive to shift their business models to one that rewarded the company with the most
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safeguards for security and privacy (Kennedy and Zallaps 1999, Esbin 1999). This would set the
early stages for modern ISPs who take on the functions of “enhanced services.”
In the late-1970s and mid-1980s, the FCC refined this with their Computer II72 and III73
Inquiries. The internet was now leaving the jurisdiction of government offices and the military.
With the internet rolling out to consumers, the FCC had to clarify its jurisdiction. They
“determined that the enhanced services market was competitive, and that consumers were
deriving benefits from this competition” so “the Commission declined to regulate enhanced
services as common carriage under Title II of the Act” (Esbin 1999, 60). This would be the first
ruling by the FCC: they explicitly reject jurisdiction over ISPs that reformat the text being sent
but still retain jurisdiction over simple “message switching” ISPs who don’t modify the
information. Esbin (1999) simplifies this perfectly when she writes, “therefore, a service that
allows subscribers to calculate the Dow Jones average using software located off the subscribers'
premises would not be a cable service, even though a service that makes the Dow Jones average
available to all subscribers would be a cable service” (85).
After this lack of jurisdiction was seemingly codified in a parallel way with Section 230,
phone companies were upset that the internet was not being held to the same standard as they
were. From an economic standpoint, they feared that internet telephony would drive traditional
telecommunications out of business. As a result, their trade association, America’s Carriers
Telecommunication Association (ACTA), petitioned 74 the FCC for rulemaking to take control of
the internet in the same way it regulated their traditional telephone clients. Likely recognizing
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either the validity of their concern or the costs of displeasing the telecommunications industry,
the FCC immediately began seeking ancillary authority over the internet (“enhanced services” as
it was known at the time). In a 1996 order, the FCC cited no less than four textual grounds for
ancillary authority.75 Two years later, a new round of FCC chairs would declare, in their
bi-annual address to Congress76, that the use of cable doesn’t make the internet subject to Title II
jurisdiction. This, in conjunction with their 1998 proposed rulemaking order77 which attempted
to codify such a sentiment, represents a stark contrast from their 1996 reasoning. To boot, the
1998 and 1996 orders both cited the same sections (Section 271-272) to justify their
contradictory reasonings. Even worse, this 1998 reasoning would be reversed again in a 1999
FCC order78 that used a definition technicality as an attempt to “backdoor” their way into internet
regulation. From this point, the chain novel had commenced. Subsequent FCC attempts to
regulate and then disavow regulation over “enhanced services” would need to be ever more
complex in order to not disrupt the legitimacy of previous orders.

75

Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Section 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996)
76
In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, para. 73 (1998)
77
In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 24012-13, (1998)
78
In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398 (1999)

90

Text Cited

Argument Summary

Where?

Section 151

The internet uses cables and is,
therefore, a common carrier under Title
II regulation.

1996 ACTA Petition

Section 271/272

These sections give the FCC regulatory
authority over “Bell Operating
Companies,” which are the local
internet connection providers that
resulted after a 1982 breakup of AT&T.
If the FCC can control the internet
connection, it, therefore, has the power
to control ISP access for consumers. If
it can control ISP access, it can control
access to ISP content by extension.

Section 601

Section 601 says that nothing within the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
should be construed as limiting or
circumventing Federal authority unless
otherwise stated. Section 230(b)(2) is
not a legally binding statement and
therefore its preclusion of Federal
regulation is not reason enough to
prevent this section from giving the
FCC jurisdiction.

Section 254

Section 254 empowers the FCC to
provide equitable “access to advanced
telecommunications and information
services should be provided in all
regions of the nation.”79

Section 706

FCC argued that an “interactive
computer service” was a type of
“advanced telecommunications
capacity” (ATC) provider which is
under Title II.

1996 FCC Order

1999 FCC Order

Figure 7: An illustration of the unique sections that had to be cited in each successive attempt by the FCC to get
ancillary authority after being hamstrung by a previous FCC order. (Source: Crawford 1997, Fried 1999, Comstock
and Butler 2000, Whiteley 2000, Chen 2001)
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Although this is a simplified illustration of the nuance that underscores each iterative
attempt by the FCC, it goes to show that the FCC hamstrung itself at an early point and soiled the
metaphorical regulatory garden for years to come. As Lyons (2013) notes, “the Commission has
invoked its ancillary authority roughly 65 times since 2007 – approximately the same number of
times it has invoked its ancillary authority during the entirety of its history up to that point… the
Commission is grasping at statutory language to justify imposing its own mandates” (5). As
Esbin (2009) comically furthers, “Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes… this
exercise — searching for snippets and threads of regulatory authority over a communications
medium as significant as the Internet in multiple, unrelated statutory provisions — itself should
signal to the reviewing court that the exercise is unlikely to produce a credible source of
authority” (2-3). This unclear regulatory designation would result in decades more of this
haphazard chain novel.

Date

Action

Effect on Internet Industry

2002

FCC determines that ISPs are not a Title II
“telecommunications provider” and were solely a
Title I “information service”

Deregulatory

2003

Ninth circuit ruled that ISPs had
telecommunication functions and should be
regulated under Title II

Regulatory

2004

FCC Chair Powell implements this ruling by
asking for voluntary neutrality of ISPs in his
"Preserving Network Freedom" order

Regulatory

2005

National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Services (2005) - Supreme
Court reverses the 9th circuit case (2003) and
rules that FCC currently placed ISPs under Title I
but that it has the power to change that

Both Regulatory and
Deregulatory

2006

Comcast/AT&T contract establishes voluntary net

Regulatory
92

neutrality in their contract (Esbin and Marcus
2008)
2008

FCC censures Comcast/AT&T for breaking the
voluntary “Preserving Network Freedom” order

Regulatory

2010

DC Circuit Court of Appeals overturns FCC’s
censure and vacates their “Preserving Network
Freedom” order because it was not enacted in a
way that passed the Chevron (1984) test

Deregulatory

2010

FCC alleges textual authority in a 2010 “Open
Internet Order” under Section 706 (which
SCOTUS implied in their 2005 decision) rather
than ancillary authority

Regulatory

2011

Verizon sued the FCC alleging that it was
applying Title II principles to Title I services and
wins their case in 2014

Deregulatory

2015

An Obama FCC takes the leap and reclassifies
ISPs under Title II

2017

A Trump FCC reverses Obama’s Title II
classification and vacates net neutrality

2021

A Biden FCC announces it plans to reverse
Trump’s reversal and reinstate net neutrality

Regulatory
Deregulatory
Regulatory

Figure 8: A synthesis of the back-and-forth between the FCC, the courts, and private ISPs over net neutrality and
their attempts to patch together authority from 2001-2021 (Source: Esbin and Marcus 2008, Esbin 2009, Gioia 2008,
Thompson 2010, Ruane 2011, Candeub 2020, Cheah 2021)

By the turn of the century, the courts finally had enough case law to hear a definitive case
about the FCC’s purported jurisdiction over the internet. In a landmark case, National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services (2005), the FCC had to concede
that it did not have statutory authority over the internet but the Supreme Court did agree that it
had ancillary authority under Chevron (1984). The court said that the FCC’s current
classification of the internet left it under Title I but importantly affirmed that the FCC, not
Congress, has the power to reclassify it. As a result, this issue received executive branch
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attention and became an issue for presidential administrations rather than changing
administrations within the FCC. From 2005 to 2015, the internet remained unregulated80. In
2015, President Obama was concerned with the growing inequality in the regulatory landscape.
Networks could legally slow down access to certain sites on the internet. President Obama urged
the FCC to reclassify it as a Title II common carrier in order to apply a Title II principle, equity
of access,” to networks on the internet in the same way it was required for telecommunications
carriers. The FCC obliged and voted 3-2 along party lines to approve the change.81 In 2017,
President Trump urged the FCC, under Ajit Pai, to reverse that order and remove net neutrality
principles. Pai obliged and voted 3-2 along party lines to reverse the reclassification and make
the internet an unregulated service of the FCC again.82 In 2021, President Biden passed an
executive order directing the FCC to reverse that reversal and reinstate net neutrality83; that
instruction is just waiting on the Senate to confirm Gigi Sohn to fill the vacancy left by Pai’s
retirement in 2021.

Impact of Volatile Jurisdiction
This patchwork regulatory framework is not just distressing to academics and policy
wonks but has manifested itself in tangible harms for free speech. This created a volatile
regulatory environment where especially nascent ISPs in the late 90s were forced to act as if they
were in Europe. With uncertainty over whether they were subject to potential FCC fines at any
given time, ISPs were incentivized to remove any content that could violate the FCC decency
and obscenity guidelines established for common carriers. As Esbin (2009) notes, “unchecked
80
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regulatory discretion under the amorphous doctrine of ‘ancillary jurisdiction’ is every bit as big a
danger to a free and open Internet as any of the other dangers the FCC posits” (5). In addition to
abstract incentives, this chain novel had real impacts on judicial equity. This volatility meant
some ISPs were getting protection while others were not despite being sued for the same thing
and it all depended on when the suit happened amidst changing, or otherwise unclear,
regulations.
Take for example the Cubby (1991), Stratton (1996), and Lunney (1999) case study. In
1991, Cubby was protected because it was a “distributor” and exercised no editorial control. In
1996, Prodigy was punished for cleaning up the internet because it exerted some editorial control
and was, therefore, a “publisher.” In 1999, Prodigy was sued for the same charge (defamation) in
the same Southern District of New York court but this time by teenager Alex Lunney. Following
the 1999 FCC Order84, Prodigy argued that it was akin to the telephone company. Prodigy argued
that telephone companies are not responsible for tapping every phone, so they shouldn’t be
responsible for tapping every message. While this sounds logical, remember that this reasoning
runs counter to the exceptionalist distinction that was made in the 1960s and 70s in the Computer
Inquiries and codified in the 1996 bill. In this 1999 case, the judge bought Prodigy’s rationale
and gave them immunity under a 1974 case (Anderson v. New York Tel. Co) that is only supposed
to apply to telephone companies. Although the 1999 Prodigy case ended the way Cox and
Wyden would have wanted, it wasn’t for the right reasons. ISPs shouldn’t be able to classify as
common carriers when it’s convenient and unregulated services when it’s not. If Prodigy really
felt it was a common carrier, then the FCC would have had some oversight that could have
prevented Lunney from being wronged in the first place. But Prodigy avoided FCC regulation
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while Lunney was being defamed, but then called themselves an FCC-regulated common carrier
before the judge when they needed to get out of their suit.
Although the FCC could be a great resource for incentivizing ISPs to utilize their Section
230(c)(2) self-moderation protections, I argue that the haphazard regulatory patchwork of the
FCC has created a volatile legal environment and questions about the validity of FCC
jurisdiction that preclude them from being an effective partner in the war on objectionable
content. So the question remains: do ISPs need a Federal regulator to incentivize them to
self-moderate? The answer is an unfortunate “yes.” Will it happen? The answer is also an
unfortunate “no.”

Expired Pathways to ISP Self-Moderation
With a majority of the world’s ISPs being based in the United States, the next logical
question becomes: why don’t they self-police themselves? After all, they have sweeping Section
230(c)(2) immunity for all good faith efforts at self-policing. Cleaner platforms attract more
users and are more profitable than sites that are cesspools of objectionable content. So what’s
stopping Facebook, Instagram, Youtube, or Twitter from picking up the torch that the FCC
dropped? The answer is threefold. First, “ask nicely” was an unsustainable policy. ISPs have a
financial opportunity now that didn’t exist in the early-2000s which incentivizes inflammatory
content to be left up. They hide this financial opportunity behind a plausible and understandable
(even if untrue) argument that there is just too much content. Under this sweeping immunity,
content creation outpaced the growth of ISPs and their ability to keep up. Second, actions taken
in 2015 linked content moderation to net neutrality. As a result of this merge, mandating stricter
self-moderation could come to the detriment of another powerful internet principle, equity of
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access. Finally, even if there was political consensus at a philosophical level and ISPs felt there
was requisite public outcry to necessitate coming to the table, these technology companies have a
stronghold on actual bill passage that gives them essentially a get-out-of-jail-free card behind the
scenes.

Changing ISP Business Models
When the internet was smaller in scale, ISPs were hungry to attract customers and
competed with each other for customers by offering them and their families the most content
safeguards. Think back to the Stratton case in 1996 where Prodigy lauded themselves as a
pioneer in content moderation and used newspaper advertisements to flaunt their safeguards.
Although they were punished for it in a pre-Section 230 world, their business model was
nonetheless the norm at the time. As these tech firms grew, their user bases became, for lack of a
better word, addicted to them.
The algorithms kept users engaged and people were not choosing between Facebook or
Instagram – the in-vogue thing was to have a Facebook and an Instagram account. In addition to
the user base landscape changing, the landscape of ISPs themselves can also be said to have
changed. This industry developed further as a result of the sweepingly immune legal landscape,
companies merged, and those that didn’t merge would eventually form a symbiotic relationship.
They recognized that there was power in pseudo-collusion. In economic terms, the relationship
that these platforms share can be likened to that of a cartel. They are so powerful as a result of
this deregulation that they set the rules and govern the conduct of each other. Instead of having to
fight to be the cleanest site, as long as they all exert the same level of content moderation the
level itself can be rather low.
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They make more money, after all, from inflammatory content which drives interactions
and therefore drives up page views and ad revenue. Although mitigating objectionable content
drives up user bases, these sites have hit an inflection point. Each inflammatory, objectionable
post they allow is more financially valuable than the profit lost by that reciprocal number of
users being turned off by it (Cohen-Almagor 2017, Gillespie 2020). Tsesis (2017) argues that
there are many cases in which this manifests itself. Facebook, in particular, has “reviewed”
content that is clearly against its written terms of service and then allowed it to stay online like
“Death to Zionist baby killer Israeli Jews” and a page called “Stab Israelis” (609).
Many ISPs can hide this financial incentive for objectionable content behind a veil of
technological incapability. In this, they have to ride a fine line between being the leader in
technological knowledge and yet simultaneously alleging that they lack the technological ability
to moderate such a large quantity of content. As Cohen-Almagor (2015) highlights in
Confronting the Internet's Dark Side: Moral and Social Responsibility on the Free Highway,
there is overwhelming evidence in the technologically-savvy community to show an ability to
monitor this quantity of content, but reciprocally overwhelming evidence to show that there is an
unwillingness to do so. The sheer scale of ISPs is a plausible excuse to the layman public for not
catching enough objectionable content. Only when the financial harms of user outcry exceed the
financial benefits of maximizing usership and viewpoints will sites begin to self-police. As
Cohen-Almagor (2017) writes, “Facebook invests in profitable activities and does not invest in
unprofitable activities.” Of all the things on Facebook’s plate, content moderation “isn’t that
important'' (433). He furthers that Facebook takes objectively less pressing issues equally if not
more seriously than policing for radicalizing content: for example, it has a team of specialists
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that only investigates fake identities while that team could be better allocated to the content
moderation division which yields much more severe consequences if understaffed (434).
To prove the existence of such ambivalence in the absence of public outcry, look no
further than the case study of Anwar al-Awlaki. Anwar al-Awlaki was a leading propagandist for
Al Qaeda that the U.S. killed in a 2011 drone strike. He was a well-known figure with a large
following among terror cells but not by any means a household name like Osama Bin Laden or
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Despite his being deceased, his content remained online. Four years after
his death, 68,400 videos of his still remained online. Six years after his death, that number only
dropped by 0.6% to 68,000. His videos would become pervasive recruitment material for U.S.
domestic jihadi cells. His videos would later go on to inspire 56 individual U.S. extremists whose
executed terror plots resulted in the death of 93 civilians, 5 service members, and 417 Americans
injured from 2001 to 2019. An additional 17 domestic terror plots within that period were
fortunately foiled before coming to completion.
Most notably his videos were cited as inspirations by Nidal Hasan who murdered 13 and
wounded 32 in the 2009 Fort Hood shooting rampage, the Boston Marathon bombers, the San
Bernadino terrorists, the terrorists to attempted to kill at the “Draw Muhammad” cartoon contest
in Garland, TX, Mohammad Youssef Abdulazeez who murdered four Marines in 2015, and the
Pulse night club murderer in 2016.85 After Hassan’s rampage at Fort Hood, al-Awlaki glorified
him with a post titled “Nidal Hassan Did the Right Thing” (Cohen-Almagor 2017, 443). There is
little doubt that al-Awlaki’s content was objectionable and radicalized domestic terrorists that
harmed Americans. It’s extreme to say that Facebook is complicit in this, but it is reasonable to
say that Facebook is at the very least more ambivalent than they should be to such content. Hany
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Farid86 puts it well, “It’s not a technical problem, . . . [i]t’s a policy issue. I think the speech and
privacy issues are tricky. But to say there’s nothing we can do about it is cowardice.” In response
to calls from the Counter Extremism Project to delete al-Awlaki’s content, YouTube responded
with a statement saying it permits “videos posted with a clear news or documentary purpose.”87
No matter where you watch your documentaries or get your news, I’m doubtful that anyone
would consider videos with titles like “A Call to Jihad” to be a legitimate documentary or
unbiased news broadcast.
Eventually, YouTube would take down almost 60,000 of al-Awlaki’s videos in response
to public pressure.88 But such a “watershed moment” as the New York Times called it is in stark
juxtaposition to the treatment that other more financially-impactful content received from these
sites. As Shane explains, “copyrighted material, child pornography and beheading videos, for
example, [pose] an obvious threat to their business” and such are removed at a far more
responsive rate than al-Awlaki’s content.89 In another instance of seeming duality, Facebook’s
Director of Policy, Simon Milner, alleges that flagging potentially terrorist activity is a priority
but deflects responsibility for preventing future content by noting that such content creators are
best addressed by law enforcement and not repeated censorship by the ISP (Cohen-Almagor
2017).
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Even if we do take the above argument by ISPs at face value and assume that there is
indeed too much content on the internet, Milner’s statements reflect the fact that Section 230’s
sweeping immunity led us to that point. Milner’s statements don’t argue it would be hard to have
enacted a more expansive and stringent self-policing policy, he argues it would be hard to
“change to” such a system (Cohen-Almagor 2017, 431). This blanket immunity allowed for a
rapid proliferation of content which far outpaced the ability of ISPs to grow in tandem (Gillespie
2020). Overall, sites have a financial incentive to keep inflammatory content up and couch that
incentive behind a veil of technological inability that is plausible at the layman’s level (even if
disproven by technology experts).

Veto Power of Big Technology
Even if there is both political consensus on a solution and there is enough public outcry to
outweigh the financial incentives of the status quo for ISPs, there is a low likelihood that
meaningful legislation can be passed. ISPs are more than happy to come to the table but they
know that such appearances are largely public relations endeavors. The CEOs of many of the
largest social media platforms gave countless hours of testimony before Congress in 2021. Their
soundbites were well-rehearsed, direct, and painted a picture that they were not opposed to
regulation. This, coupled with the complimenting advertisements90 of ISPs and increases in the
number of Americans in favor of regulating content moderation 91, should signal a shift in the
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Overton window away from the deregulatory history of U.S. technology policy. And yet no
reciprocal legislation was passed in response to their seeming cooperation?
In 2021, Apple, Amazon, Google and Facebook alone spent $55 million in registered
lobbying expenditures (a 62% increase from 2020). A large part of this increase is tied to these
sites fighting allegations that their platforms bore responsibility for radicalizing terror attacks
like the January 6th insurrection, the Orlando nightclub shooting, and others. For example,
Google increased its lobbying efforts by 27 percent (from $7.5 million in 2020 to $9.5 million in
2021) in response to YouTube’s alleged contribution to right-wing extremism. 92 This money goes
into killing bills that seek to challenge the technological hegemony of the larger social media
platforms with the money to lobby. Popiel notes that this is often successful. In addition to killing
bills before they reach the floor this money is also valuable in killing support for bills that do
make it to the floor of Congress. He cites Facebook and Google’s defeat of the Commercial
Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011 and Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Twitter’s successful
defeat of the Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011 as examples of such power despite Congressional
support (Popiel 2018).
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Figure 9: Cumulative lobbying expenditures by internet industry firms (Source: OpenSecrets)

In addition to the sheer power of the “Big Tech” lobby, their status as a now quasi-public
utility can be used as a bargaining chip. Intelligence communities around the world have
increasingly deepened their reliance on the services of these ISPs over the years for crucial
signals intelligence (or SIGINT). This new, social media intelligence (dubbed SOCMINT) is
used as an argument for why a deregulated internet is actually beneficial to the war against
objectionable content and objectionable actions. SOCMINT “provides a new opportunity for law
enforcement to generate operational intelligence that could help identify criminal activity,
indicate early warning of outbreaks of disorder, provide information and intelligence about
groups and individuals, and help understand and respond to public concerns” (Omand et al.
2012, 805). The deregulatory nature of the internet incentivizes speech. Even if objectionable,
such speech still points intelligence communities in the direction of those hiring hitmen, those
looking to plan attacks, those with psychologically violent tendencies, and pedophiles seeking to
groom victims among other examples. As Google CEO, Sundar Pichai, ominously implied, “I
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worry that if you regulate for the sake of regulating, it has a lot of unintended consequences …
[including] implications for our national security.”93
If we regulate the internet, this objectionable speech may go away from the public eye.
But it will just migrate to the dark web where it is harder for law enforcement to gather
SOCMINT. Surveillance-related national interests are often used as a reason to overlook the
sector's monopolistic tendencies, economically inefficient copyright protections, and
undemocratic commercialization of essential digital services (Popiel 2018). McChesney (2013)
details the way that this is both a bargaining chip and a debt owed. In exchange for this seeming
deregulatory deference, ISPs routinely comply with thousands of government requests for
information. Specifically, Google received at least 10,000 requests for user information from
national security organizations in 2011 and voluntarily complied with more than 93% of them
(McChesney 2013). Although this relationship has become marginally more regulated as a result
of updated data privacy regulations, there still exists an off-book relationship between the U.S.
intelligence community and ISPs that affords ISPs a great deal of security from overly regulatory
legislative action. Even if there was political will to pass something at an ideological level and
public outcry was great enough to bring ISPs to the table, these platforms have two crucial
insurance policies that prevent unwanted legislative action: their financially significant lobbying
efforts and their role as a quasi-public utility within the intelligence community.
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Contradictory Political Landscape
In 2014, President Obama urged the FCC to reclassify broadband under Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934. 94 He was concerned about internet fairness and recognized that the
only way to avoid the textual patchwork that was created from 2002-2013 (see Figure 6) was to
fully reclassify ISPs under Title II. A 3-2 FCC voted to do just that and officially created a
codified net neutrality jurisdiction. Although net neutrality is about equality of access, its
reclassification of ISPs under Title II gives them many more regulatory avenues to control the
quality of content on the internet in the same way it did for television and radio. From this point,
net neutrality and intermediary liability were trailers tethered to the same truck, Title II. If a
future administration wanted to modify content moderation jurisdiction, they would be affecting
net neutrality and vice versa. The problem: these two issues cannot coexist under modern
political priorities adopted by the two major parties.
Section 230 has been likened to both a sword and a shield in intermediary liability case
law. Section 230(c)(1) shields from liability for the content they choose to leave up, so long as
it’s provided by a user. Section 230(c)(2) is a sword that allows sites to take down content
provided by users. Democrats would like to weaken the shield and strengthen the sword. They
feel sites can do more under Section 230(c)(2) to police for objectionable content and benefit too
much from the shield of Section 230(c)(1). Republicans would like to strengthen the shield and
weaken the sword. Republicans believe that sites have too much power under Section 230(c)(2)
and allege they use it to censor right-leaning voices. One place we’ve seen manifestations of this
political disagreement is in the lack of coordination in bringing bills to the floor. In the 116th
Congress (2019-2020), twenty-six different bills were brought to the floor of the House or Senate
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that would have amended Section 230 (Brannon and Holmes 2021). This issue has become so
ideologically complex that a team of researchers, called Future Tense95 have started a constantly
updating list of such bills. They divide all the bills into four categories: full repeal, limiting the
scope, imposing new obligations, and modifying Good Samaritan protections.96 Their research
has tried to make sense of this legislative landscape but to ISPs and government regulators alike,
the landscape for legislative reform looks more like a Jackson Pollock painting than a van Gogh
or a Monet.
Concerned with the economic impact that regulation of networks was having on
innovation and competition, the Trump administration implored the FCC, under Ajit Pai, to
repeal net neutrality.97 They would eventually do so and they did it in part by linking it to Section
230 and, more specifically, the “unfettered” clause in Section 230(b)(2). In fact, the FCC’s 2015
Restoring Internet Freedom Order cited Section 230 eighty-four (84) times as statutory evidence
that the FCC had no control over broadband internet equity and ISPs (referred to at times as
“edge providers”). However, by forfeiting jurisdiction, Trump lost the regulatory arm that could
have controlled content moderation practices by ISPs. It’s in this way that the politics of the issue
are divided. If Republicans want to prevent alleged internet censorship, they need to establish
jurisdiction by conceding ISPs are under Title II, but doing so would mean they have to
guarantee Title II protections to ISPs (like equality of access) and therefore reinstate net
neutrality. As a result of this regulatory patchwork, it’s become hard for Republicans to have
their and eat it too. Conversely, Democrats are fearful that overly regulating ISPs could have
deleterious effects on counterspeech (speech that seeks to dilute extremist points of view and
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bring the debate back to a more moderate perspective), and yet simultaneously want a highly
regulated internet landscape under net neutrality. FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel put it
well when she said, “In the end, it’s not just the hypocrisy that disappoints, or the intellectual
contortions required to make sense of this. It’s the dishonesty. It can’t be that the FCC points to
Section 230 to disavow authority over broadband but then uses the same law to insist it can turn
around and serve as the President’s speech police."98
Trump attempted to use a backdoor route around this legislative dissonance in his 2018
“Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship." It directed the Secretary of Commerce to
direct the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to direct the
FCC to consider rulemaking.99 As anyone can tell, it’s not particularly the most ironclad of legal
orders and would later be held up by two pending court challenges over its constitutionality
before being ultimately repealed by Biden in 2021.100, 101
Aside from the divided political consensus over content moderation itself, the patchwork
has forced net neutrality and content moderation to ride the same statutory bus, Title II. Even if
there was political consensus to clarify regulatory authority over ISPs, doing so would likely
require throwing net neutrality to the wayside. As a result of the chain novel regulatory structure,
legislators have been backed into some corners: is it the policy of the U.S. to strongly regulate
content or promote network growth through deregulation? The tradeoffs come as a result of the
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patchwork regulatory regime and are only further exacerbated by the rise of platform power
amidst that patchwork.

Conclusion
Of all the thousands of leads that the U.S. intelligence community tracks down every day,
Brad Rukstales, “dog dad” and master griller from suburban Chicago, was nowhere near the top
of their list. His exemplary behavior as a charitable father of two and self-aware critic of social
media and alternative news are the antithesis of what we would expect when we’re presented
with pictures of January 6th insurrectionists. We’re more disposed to believe someone that looks
like the QAnon Shaman with his face painted and head adorned with a menacing fur pelt. But if
the internet has taught us anything over the past three decades, looks aren’t everything. Social
media platforms and the algorithms that they employ have had a big role in curating content on
the internet at a more individual and interactive level than previously available in other mediums
like radio, television, or print journalism.
Contrary to these other mediums, the internet was uniquely classified as neither a
distributor, nor a speaker, nor a publisher. A new class of intermediary liability was created in the
name of bolstering the development of this nascent industry. The deregulatory framework
employed by the U.S., in contrast to the approach taken by the European Union, incentivizes a
higher quantity of content to stay up online. The European approach, on the other hand, would
rather preemptively remove objectionable content than let the free marketplace of ideas and
“counterspeech” dilute the objectionable material. This U.S. approach is codified in Section 230
which immunizes both content left up and good faith efforts to remove objectionable content.
The problem is that this broad immunity is not coupled with a clear regulatory counterpart that
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can incentivize ISPs to use their Section 230(c)(2) privilege to take bad content down without
liability.
The FCC would be an ordinarily ideal regulatory agency to do just that. They already
have fine structures they use on “common carriers” like radio, television, and
telecommunications to compel self-moderation and punish attempts to circumvent existing
decency guidelines. However, the conflicting legislative history and text of Section 230 create
uncertainty of whether the FCC has jurisdiction over the internet. On one hand, Section 230 is
within a larger piece of legislation (the Communications Act of 1934) that explicitly names the
FCC as its regulatory agent – hence the jurisdiction over other mediums mentioned above. On
the other hand, the text of the section itself, the floor debates about its passage, and the omission
of the pro-FCC Exon amendment all suggest that Congress did not want the FCC involved in any
way in internet oversight.
This contradiction and the patchwork regulatory nature of a politically appointed agency
like the FCC creates a sort of “chain novel dilemma.” Each successive administration of the FCC
has to work with the chapters previously written and try to craft the chapter they’ve been
empowered to write in a way that accomplishes their goals without trampling too much on the
characters and storylines written by administrations before them. This unclear regulatory
jurisdiction largely precluded the FCC from being involved in enforcing decency standards or
incentivizing ISPs to use their Section 230(c)(2) privileges for the past twenty-five years. Only in
2015, was FCC jurisdiction finally clarified when the internet was moved under Title II of the
1934 Act rather than Title I (a privilege that was only recognized by the Supreme Court almost
ten years after the passage of the CDA). From this point, however, the regulation of the internet
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would leave the hands of FCC attorneys and become a more political issue that sat at the
doorstep of Presidential administrations.
Trump’s reversal in 2017 of Obama’s net neutrality doctrine would cite Section 230’s
“unfettered” clause extensively in justifying the fact that the Federal government had no
jurisdiction over broadband internet and the ISPs that used it. From this point, net neutrality and
content moderation became trailers attached to the same truck, Title II. As a result of this
complicated political landscape, it becomes difficult to reform either policy without affecting the
other. Democrats want to see a strong net neutrality but not see the chilling effects on free speech
that would come from regulating the platforms in the way Trump suggested. Republicans would
like to dismantle net neutrality and see the broadband industry flourish, but in doing so would
have to relinquish their jurisdiction over ISPs and their ability to prevent alleged censorship of
conservative voices.
The question then becomes: “why don’t ISPs just pick up the slack that the FCC has been
unable to do and Congress is unable to change?” The answer: it’s too cost-prohibitive to do so.
Sites don’t operate under the same business model now as when they did in the 90s. There is still
demand for a clean platform, but technology companies can form a sort of oligopoly which
allows them to set their content moderation standards relatively low so long as they keep parity
with their competitors. The social media sector has grown tremendously in power both
financially and politically since the 1990s and especially since the late 2010s. They now operate
one of the largest lobbying industries in US politics and have cemented their value in the US
intelligence community in a way that they are indispensable and can evade unwanted regulatory
attempts despite the theater of being “in favor of new regulations.” This is largely the reason why
no meaningful, well-drafted content moderation legislation has been passed in over two decades.

110

SESTA/FOSTA was a farce in the eyes of the legal community and represents the only major edit
to the foundational law of internet technology in the United States.
While it’s tough to prove causally that Rukstales’ radicalization along with the
radicalization of the many other domestic terrorists was a result of platform ambivalence, I have
argued that Section 230 and its deregulatory framework have created incentive structures that
increase the likelihood of such radicalizing content remaining online for impressionable eyes to
see. The U.S. set out in 1996 to prevent the internet from becoming a haven of objectionable
content visible for kids and clearly knew the risks associated with a deregulated internet. But
they chose to counter this objectionable content not with preemptive removal, like in Germany,
but by flooding the marketplace of ideas with counterspeech to dilute the prevalence of the bad
content. This is not a bad plan in and of itself. But it failed to account for the fact that ISPs would
eventually become more powerful (financially, politically, socially) than they were in the 1990s,
no longer have an incentive to take the proper content down when it had the chance, and create
an algorithm that curates this content for people circumventing the benefits of counterspeech.
Without a nimble and proactive regulatory agency, like the FCC, to update guidelines and keep
ISPs in line, the inmates begin running the asylum; content on the internet is regulated not by
elected officials but by corporations and others who stand to benefit from inflammatory content
and the ad revenue it brings.
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Chapter 4: Alternatives and Interlopers
As the previous chapters have made clear, the U.S. and Germany exist on two linearly
different ends of a spectrum. While the U.S. regime set out to prioritize the growth of the internet
sector through a deregulatory framework and the German regime set out to prioritize the
wellbeing of citizens through a preemptive framework, both the U.S. and Germany share one
thing in common: their predilection for the freedom of expression and internet privacy. Although
I place them at opposite ends of a spectrum, that spectrum in and of itself still operates in
complete juxtaposition to the regulatory regimes undertaken by authoritarian nation-states like
Russia and China. The heavy-handed internet censorship of Eastern autocracies could certainly
cure many of the woes bemoaned in previous chapters related to radicalization and its translation
into violence.
Although my larger argument critiques the conceptualization of the internet within
Western democratic regulatory regimes, that does not mean Western democracy and its principles
are incompatible with a more comprehensive and responsible regulation of internet speech. An
alternative to democratic regulation would be dictatorial control over the pathways of
information. While I will highlight in this chapter that such is highly effective in addressing the
dependent variable (violence stemming from radicalization) in my argument, this chapter serves
to juxtapose Western democratic regulation against their much worse alternatives: the internet
censorship of authoritarian countries like Russia and China.
Before doing so, it’s important to conceptualize why these alternatives are important to
the argument. Although the frameworks of these two countries are not alternatives that
democracies like the U.S. and Germany would be likely to adopt, they represent alternatives that
nonetheless affect the U.S. and Germany. My previous chapters have not compared apples to
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oranges; my argument does not evaluate whether a deregulatory framework would have worked
in Germany or vice versa. This is not a comparative analysis between the U.S. and Germany.
This thesis has offered an analysis of each regulatory framework and how it functions amidst the
larger regulatory regime at play in the country. But it becomes important to realize that the
internet is a transnational industry. With few exceptions, almost all content is available in some
way everywhere at the same time. The success of the U.S. and Germany in curbing radicalizing
content therefore cannot only come from reconciling their incongruous frameworks within the
larger regimes but also must take into account the risk posed by authoritarian regimes trespassing
within the openness of democratic internet regulations.
As a result of this transnational nature, the shared support for freedom of expression in the two
democracies comes at a cost. The ‘fallacy of liberalism’ posits that by opening up the doors for
free expression, you inherently leave the doors open for bad actors looking to exploit your
openness. By having comparatively less restrictive liability regimes than Russia and China, the
U.S. and Germany allow foreign interlopers to join their domestic marketplaces of ideas. As we
saw in the 2016 U.S. election, incentivizing a free internet allows foreign meddling where fake
identities can post propaganda that could influence the behavior of millions.102

Russia: “The Psychological Firewall”
Russia’s crackdown on internet speech is a fairly recent concept compared to China’s.
Before 2007, Russian social media was outside the purview of Putin’s master plan. He targeted
mass media like television and newspapers and put them under state control (Nisbet et al 2017).
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The oversight of social media at the time was left up to a court-order standard like the U.S. but a
less stringent one. Blocked sites could get around weak restrictions with technological fixes and
were often only blocked in one region of Russia and not the whole country (Soldatov 2017). The
functionality and popularity of modern social media platforms did not explode until around 2008.
Before 2009, the “internet” was limited to primarily “message switching” where messages could
be shared between terminals by sending messages to designated usernames, IP addresses, or onto
message boards but there was no automatic curation. In 2009, however, came the advent of
algorithms. Facebook created the first algorithm (called EdgeRank) which curated content using
three factors (affinity, rank, decay). Two years later, that would be replaced with an algorithm
called “News Feed” that used 100k factors, and the algorithm would only grow from there.103
Suffice it to say, Putin was more concerned with the power of television and radio than the
limited functionality of social media.
This is until the 2011-2012 riots. These riots were to protest the amateur videos posted on
social media sites like Facebook and Twitter showing ballot stuffing and other voter fraud in the
2011 Parliamentary victory for Putin’s party.104 As a result of Facebook and other social medias’
heavy hands in rallying support for the riots against him, Putin began to crack down on platforms
in the same way he had previously done by nationalizing television and radio stations (Nisbet et
al 2017). Because Russia had not always had a clamped down censorship system, Putin had to
get creative on how to achieve his policy priorities. Russia uniquely put the onus on networks
rather than ISPs or the government to moderate content. Putin characterized the internet as
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something being used by both domestic extremists and alleged “that foreign powers use the
Internet to pursue political and military objectives against Russia” thereby necessitating his
creation of a “bulletproof vest” of protection for Russians (Nisbet et al 2017, 960). Putin alleged
that he was building a firewall for the psychological protection of all Russians and framed his
actions as something akin to Germany’s defensive democratic model.
The government under the Roskomnadzor (Federal Service for Supervision of Mass
Communication) contracted NGOs like Safe Internet League and Mediaguard to blacklist sites
and oversee the enforcement of the bans (Soldatov 2017). These NGOs and government agencies
then used networks as the enforcement mechanism. ISPs (ie: Twitter) use networks (ie: AT&T or
Verizon) to transmit their content after their users request it. Since no ISPs were domiciled in
Russia at the time, Putin had to resort to the networks. Networks could lose their license for
negligently allowing a blacklisted site to be transmitted into Russia. In addition, Russia imposed
the cost of such enforcement on the networks themselves. All the tracking and filtering
equipment was paid for and maintained by the networks (Soldatov 2017). This proved rather
effective: by using the networks as a choke point, Putin could more easily control the spread of
information. Networks can filter for content that is posted on all sites that go over their
connection, whereas ISPs can only monitor for blacklisted content on their own sites. As a result,
networks were able to catch hundreds of mirrors of the same content on hundreds of sites
simultaneously.
Another problem: the Russian intelligence community helped draft the 2012 laws and
inextricably linked surveillance and content moderation. There was little to no oversight on
tapping the content of these platforms. They could access network data without network
permission. While a warrant was necessary, FSB (Federal Security Service) employees only had

115

to ‘show’ the warrant to their supervisor in order to tap networks and access the personal data of
any Russian citizen (Soldatov 2017). While this prevents radicalizing content from being
amplified and reproduced amongst fringe actors, it also hinders the ability of citizens and
journalists to receive and transmit information detrimental to the hegemony of the Russian
oligarchy. Nisbet et al (2017) define this phenomenon as “window opening” whereby Russians
are prevented from seeing the outside world and realizing the oppression of Vladimir Putin’s
regime (959). Just recently, Russia shut down access to Twitter and Facebook, essentially cutting
off Russians from information about Ukraine and allowing Putin to solely control the messaging
of his invasion.105 While a byproduct of this censorship is a logically lower incidence of domestic
terror, it seems hardly worth vacating countless other hallmark principles of democratic
governance to achieve it.

China: “The Information Curtain”
In a more extreme case than Russia, China has banned Facebook and Twitter since 2009
and never had the pre-2007 internet freedom that Russians enjoyed. It has always been a bastion
of internet censorship but goes about it differently. China also logically has fewer instances of
domestic terrorism but that’s because it doesn’t let any outside ideas violate Chinese digital
sovereignty or as Hillary Clinton has called it “The Information Curtain” (Kyriakopoulou 2011,
20). While Russia (barring this month’s events) has historically supported Western platforms,
China instead offers state-sponsored platforms as alternatives. Sites like Weibo and WeChat are
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platforms completely overseen by the Chinese government regardless of whether the user is in
China or another jurisdiction.106
China similarly justifies its censorship as a necessary precaution for the national security
of its citizens. China argues that state secrets are being shared on these platforms and China has a
vested interest in monitoring them.107 They use their army of government censors to monitor all
this content and preemptively restrict access to any material that may jeopardize the hegemony
of the Chinese state (Nisbit et al 2017). China clamped down on internet speech around the same
time as Russia by rewriting its statutes about state secrets to be more vague and malleable in
2010. They can now claim jurisdiction over nearly all types of surveillance even on networks and
communications that take place outside the state.
TikTok is a popular example of how an authoritarian nation can trespass within the
openness and freedom of Western democratic regulatory frameworks. In 2020, Trump sought to
force TikTok’s parent company (which is Chinese) to merge with a U.S. parent company if it
wanted to remain available in the United States. He and his then-Secretary of State alleged that
TikTok was feeding information back to its parent company which was sharing the data directly
with the Chinese Communist Party.108 In addition to this surveillance, China has a history of
flooding the U.S. with propaganda by paying influencers to peddle incorrect stories about their
human rights, the origins of COVID, and other lies that are in the interest of Chinese
hegemony.109 By having this censorship, China too has the opportunity to pollute the U.S. social
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media landscape despite our best regulatory attempts. Such is the price that Western democracies
pay for promoting a free internet.

Conclusion
Chapters 2 and 3 critiqued the current conception of internet speech regulation by
Western democracies. It put the U.S. and Germany on opposing sides of a linear spectrum. This
chapter sought to contextualize where that spectrum falls in relation to the other world
superpowers and the regulatory regimes they employ. In addition to contextualizing the earlier
chapters, this chapter highlighted the anti-democratic regime that necessarily has to accompany
the harsher framework that would be required to appropriately squash the reproduction of
objectionable content. This chapter illustrates the inherent trade-offs associated with the type of
comprehensive regulatory reform necessary to eliminate objectionable content. If the U.S. and
Germany want to maintain their democratic ideals, there are costs to be paid. They need to accept
the risk that malicious actors will seek to influence their free internet and they need to understand
that you’ll never be able to live in a world without a little objectionable or radicalizing content
unless you aggressively censor the free flow of information.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This thesis identified reasons why two beacons of democracy, the U.S. and the European
Union, not only chose mutually exclusive and linearly different regulatory frameworks but, more
importantly, why neither framework proved to be better suited in responsively addressing the rise
of radicalizing content on the internet. I argue that there are two narratives present. The
micro-narrative has to do with the perverse incentive structures created as a byproduct of either
the text of each bill or its implementation. This is bad in and of itself and has created
demonstrable barriers to each country's ability to curb this objectionable content. The
macro-narrative goes further and alleges that this cannot be blamed only on bad policy drafting
or bad implementation. Rather, each of these case studies represents an incongruous relationship
between the framework they intended and the regulatory regime that they either had in place or
created to support that framework.
From the perspective of Germany, objectionable content drowns out well-intentioned
counterspeech. This problem of the “heckler’s veto” is a result of (1) Germany’s defensive
democratic underpinnings, (2) the fact that the E.U. took some provisions of the American
D.M.C.A. but not all of it, (3) the unclarified statutory conflict between a sites’ duty of care and
its immunity from constant monitoring, and (4) the lack of oversight by the European Union on
the accurate transposition of its directive into German national legislation. Each successive
iteration of intermediary liability reform from 1997 to 2021 admittedly did clarify some aspects
of the previous legislation but failed to address the incongruity that existed between the
preemptive framework and the German regulatory regime that supported it.
The preemptive framework came as no surprise, Germany has been a leader in the
defensive democratic model since the end of WWII. Their priority was to root out objectionable
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content with force before it could take hold and damage national unity or the sanctity of the
Constitution. Such defensive democratic ideals had existed before the internet via their
Constitutional right to curtail speech if it threatens the unity of the state and such defensive
democratic ideals continued with their notice-and-takedown policies that governed internet
speech. This preemptive framework, however, was passed by the European Commission without
harmonizing the underlying laws that the framework sought to enforce. The standard of proof for
proving defamation/libel/slander, incitement, sexual harassment, threats to national sovereignty,
and many other statutes were not harmonized from member state to member state. While the
E-Commerce Directive made it clear that ISPs had to evaluate reported content in a certain
period of time, it allowed for there to exist essentially twenty-seven (27) different sets of laws
that could be applied. This created an incentive to just remove the content without a very critical
eye. Although the ECD established the country of origin principle, it didn’t create a clear
pathway for how Germany can force Italy to remove (in a timely fashion or with any certainty)
objectionable content posted on an Italian ISP that had made its way onto the smartphone of a
citizen in Berlin.
To have properly implemented the preemptive framework, the E.U. would have needed to
pass the ECD as a regulation and not a directive. They were experiencing a similar conflict with
the 1995 Data Protection Directive before eventually reenacting it as the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) in 2016. Europe recognized the transnational nature of the internet in the
policy statements of the ECD itself, and yet still chose to pass this as a directive. This
directive-based regime made supporting the European Union and Germany’s preemptive
framework extremely difficult.

120

From the perspective of the United States, counterspeech can flourish more but so too can
objectionable content. Objectionable content, therefore, exists as a smaller proportion of all
content, but in larger quantities compared to the German case study. The text of Section 230
gives nearly blanket immunity to sites for both the content that they leave up and that which they
takedown. As a result of shifting business models and a financial incentive to keep inflammatory
posts that didn’t exist in the early days of ISPs, objectionable content can flourish irrespective of
how hard well-intentioned people try to dilute it with counterspeech.
The deregulatory framework existed as a way of allowing the nascent internet industry to
blossom. This should come as no surprise either, the promise of the First Amendment and the
United States’ natural inclination to support capitalist, free-market solutions aligns well with this
largely hands-off framework. The macro-narrative becomes problematic however when you
examine what it would have taken to responsibly implement a deregulatory framework. Vesting
redress powers with the court (rather than ISPs like in Germany) is great insofar as it only rights
injustices after the plaintiffs have been wronged. There is no proactive regulatory agent, even if
non-binding, to liaise with ISPs and other stakeholders about mutual ways to make the internet a
cleaner place without having to retroactively litigate all of the effects of objectionable content.
Many drafters of the bill, like Sen. Exon, believed the FCC could fill that vital role. But Cox and
Wyden’s insistence on having a court order standard without a complimentary and nimble voice
of proactive guidance won the day. They believed ISPs were exceptional from other media
methods despite ISPs assuming the same functional roles as televisions, radios, and newspapers.
The U.S. wanted a deregulatory standard but believed that such could only exist without a
proactive overseer. As a result, ISPs have exponentially increased in power in the U.S. and can
essentially now set their own regulations.
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Finally, I juxtapose and contextualize the debate over Western democratic governance
with a brief analysis of authoritarian interlopers. I point out the costs that come as a result of
having a free and open internet and the unfortunate fact that achieving success (eliminating all
objectively objectionable content) under my puzzle naturally requires countries to sacrifice
democratic ideals. One of the fallacies of liberalism is that democracy can only flourish if a little
bit of objectionable content does as well.
In making my argument critiquing democratic conceptualizations of internet speech
regulation, I am straying from the existing literature which is oversaturated with legal solutions
to reform the legislation. I am instead contributing a structurally comparative analysis that
conceptualizes our failure to curb radicalizing content as one that results from the origins of the
bills and not any exogenous factors. Western democracies believe that updating these pieces of
legislation can be done with additional legislation. I offer instead the perspective that
democracies will only be able to move the needle on policing objectionable content if they look
at how their desired frameworks fit into the original regimes by which they were surrounded.
With this being said, additional research is nonetheless necessary to discover what else, in
addition to internet regulation, is creating this culture of objectionable content. The internet is
simply the canvas on which society is painting. I would suggest there are cultural issues at play
with regards to the inclination of users to believe things that are distortions of reality. Feelings of
alienation, isolation, poverty, oppression and general distrust in institutions among many other
emotions likely drive people to seek out ways of distorting their suboptimal reality. For example,
there exists a growing body of literature on creepypasta, or the sharing of clearly fictional horror
stories online that they allege are based on real stories. Users choose to believe the implausible is
plausible in these stories because it offers an escape from the mundane realities of life.
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Conceptions of reality and its validity are further obfuscated by the government itself. When the
U.S. government acknowledged in 2021 the fact that the armed forces surveilled and tracked
UFOs, people’s conceptions of reality were shattered. UFO deniers felt like the silly ones and it
muddied the waters between what the government said, what “rational” people chose to believe,
what “rational” people should be believing, and what is the actual reality.
The impacts of this question are unmistakable. At risk here is a fundamental aspect of
what differentiates humans from other animals and what has allowed us to progress as a society
for thousands of years, our ability to agree on reality. We may not always agree on what to build,
but we’ve predominantly had the human decency to operate with the same tools in the toolbox.
That’s not to say that addressing this problem of internet speech regulation is going to be a
panacea to returning us to a pre-truth era. That’s also not to say that truth couldn’t continue to be
distorted even with a refresh on internet speech regulations. But what is definitive is the fact that
this problem can only get worse if we do nothing. Under the status quo, life will continue to
imitate art. Our conceptions of reality and truth will be about as malleable as these sentences in
Google Docs. If we don’t want our next generations growing up in a world whose metaphorical
font, size, color, and spacing can be distorted with little effort or oversight then we must address
this issue of internet distortion before we gradually continue to lose control of it.
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